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Abstract
This thesis studies the effects of the internationalisation of the economy on 
various regional economic policies and is organised as follows: Chapter 1 
provides a general introduction. Chapter 2 studies the effects of industrial 
policy on manufacturing firms’ location decisions. Industrial policy provides 
a productive local public good, financed by locally-raised tax revenues. 
Building on the ‘new economic geography’ literature, two new, opposing 
agglomeration forces are described: first, taxation reduces the market size - 
making a region less attractive - second, production cost fall - making a region 
more attractive for firms. We analyse the conditions under which a less- 
developed region can attract industry from a more-developed region. Chapter 
3 incorporates ideas of the ‘new international trade’ literature into a ‘fiscal 
federalism’ framework with local public goods. In a two-region model, local 
public goods are underprovided if they are productive in nature and financed 
by domestic tax revenues. The degree of underprovision depends on the 
volume of trade between the two regions. This result arises as the benefit of 
provision has to be shared with the other region’s citizens whereas the cost of 
provision falls entirely on the local citizens. Finally we show that delegating 
tax policies to a supra-regional body solves this problem. Chapter 4 analyses 
zoning policies on an urban level. We show that welfare under zoning is 
higher than in the market equilibrium if residents and monopolistically- 
competitive firms compete for land in a fixed-sized city with one central 
business district (CBD). Assuming an additional out-of-town business district 
(SBD), we find that the optimal size of the CBD depends crucially on whether 
the SBD is developed by the citizens or by an absentee land-developer: in the 
latter case the CBD should be expanded to minimise the outflow of rental 
income. Chapter 5 concludes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
9
The globalisation of the world economy and major international changes in 
business practice such as the rise of the multinational corporation or the emergence 
of purpose-built business and retail parks have been some of the most striking 
economic developments of the postwar era. These developments have influenced and 
shaped the way how goods are produced and distributed, and where and by whom 
they are made. It is thus not surprising that all economically active agents, whether 
it is consumers, the workforce, capital owners or the public sector, have been affected. 
This thesis focuses on the public sector and analyses in which way these developments 
have been affecting the sector’s economic policies at different levels of government. 
Eeomomic_policies are formalised and executed within a hierarchy of government 
levels. Broadly speaking, a country’s political system consists of three tiers of 
government: the local (e.g. rural and urban municipalities), the intermediate (e.g. the 
counties or states), and themational level (Council of Europe, 1992). In addition, many 
countries have also formed ‘supra-national’ bodies such as the European Union in 
Europe. Each tier-of government is responsible for a specific set of economic policies 
__ and it is thus that the general developments have been affecting different tiers of 
government in different ways. More precisely, we are interested in which way the 
appropriate tier of government has adapted the following economic policies: industrial 
policy, public good provision and taxation policy, and finally land use zoning. The 
first two theoretical chapters of this thesis analyse the effects on economic policies at 
a national/intermediate level of-govemmenty_ whereas the third theoretical chapter 
focuses on the local level of government.
The most obvious aspect of the internationalisation of the economy over the 
past forty years has been the dramatic increase in world trade: ‘[A] particularly 
important feature of the postwar period was that trade increased more rapidly than 
production, a clear indicator of the increased internationalization of economic 
activities and of a greater interconnectedness which have come to characterize the 
world economy... By 1988 total world exports were more than four times greater than 
in 1960; total world output was a little under three times greater than in I960’
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(Dicken, 1992, p. 16). This trend has been strongest in manufacturing exports which 
in the years between 1963 and 1979 grew by 281 per cent, whereas manufacturing 
production grew by ‘only’ 149 per cent (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1992). This growth 
of world trade has implied that economies are now much more closely integrated with 
each other. However, most of this trade originated from the industrialised countries: 
their share in 1987 was 68.2 per cent of all exports, compared with only 19.7 per cent 
for developing countries. Trade between industrial countries accounted for 54.6 per 
cent of all trade (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1992)1. The GATT has played a major role 
in this development: ‘[T]he growth of trade in manufactures was made possible by the 
gradual lowering of tariffs ... and other quantitative restrictions... This was achieved 
through the establishment of GATT in 1947’ (Grimwade, 1989, p. 53). Only relatively 
recently have newly-industrialising countries (NICs) joined the developed world as 
exporting economies: ‘[T]he most noticeable change of the period from 1973 to 1985 
was the increased share of world manufacturing exports accounted for by the NICs. 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hongkong, and Singapore all achieved a big increase in their 
share of world manufacturing trade’ (Grimwade, 1989, p. 76).
However, many countries around the world and even many regions within 
otherwise developed parts of the world such as Western Europe or the United States 
have been ‘by-passed’ by this global change and have remained industrially backward 
and dependent-on imports of most industrial goods. Given this uneven distribution of 
economic and especially manufacturing activity, it is not surprising to find that 
national and regional governments of-backward regions have tried to reduce their 
dependency on imported goods by implementing specific policies. After the Second 
World War, most developing countries pursued import-substitution policies. The aim 
of these policies was to reduce the dependence on imports by raising tariffs and other 
barriers of trade and to nurture and develop domestic production. These policies were 
usually conducted in two phases: in the first phase simple consumption goods were
‘Industrial countries’ includes the USA, Western Europe, Canada and Japan.
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substituted, in the second phase more sophisticated manufactured goods followed. 
However, it soon became apparent that these policies did not have the desired effects 
of bringing about economic development and most countries abandoned them from the 
late 1960s onwards2. The NICs were the first to embrace an outward-looking and 
export-oriented development strategy, demonstrating spectacular growth rates and 
export performances. Many other developing countries followed their lead and also 
switched policies (Todaro, 1994). The liberation of trade, especially in consumer 
goods was one of the first policies implemented3. This policy was meant to increase -  
competitive pressures on domestic firms which had showed low rates of innovation 
and a high level of complacency (The Economist, 1997).
It is not only generally backward countries in the developing world but also 
the backward regions within the developed world and also formerly highly- 
industrialised but now declining regions which are interested in (re)establishing a 
domestic industrial base. Molle (1994) defines these groups as follows: ‘... 
[traditionally backward regions: ...these regions have developed hardly any-
 manufacturing or service industry and are still largely oriented to agriculture...’ (p.
427) and also ‘...[r]egions of-4ndustrial decline: ...these regions played a leading role 
at a certain stage of economic development, but have landed in difficulties as 
production conditions changed. This type of region is generally marked by inadequate 
infrastructure...’ (p. 428). Parts of Portugal, Greece, Southern Italy and Ireland belong 
to the first group, whereas parts of Northern Spain and Wales for example fall into the 
second group (Commission of the European Communities, 1993c&d)r
The study of industrial location in space has been the main theme of the ‘new 
economic geography’ literature (see for instance Krugman, 1991, and Krugman and
For a case study, see for example Wickramasinghe (1994) on Sri Lanka.
The second policy is in many cases a direct consequence of countries joining the GATT as member 
states.
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Venables, 1996)4. The effects of closer economic integration due to lower 
transportation cost and the reduction of artificial trade barriers on the location decision 
of firms have received particular attention, partly spurred by the development of the 
single market in Europe in 1992 (Emerson, 1988). Emphasis in this literature has been 
put on the importance of atomistic agents such as firms and workers in shaping the 
economic landscape. Generally, the literature has suggested that high barriers to trade 
are more likely to support a more even distribution of economic activity in space as 
firms want to locate close to their markets. A fall in trade costs, however, would 
weaken this attraction, and other forces such as exploitation of economies of scale or 
agglomeration forces due to technological and/or pecuniary externalities would become 
predominant. The trend of economic activity to agglomerate in specific locations, 
leaving other locations underdeveloped, has been attributed to these latter forces. It has 
been argued that locations which enjoyed an initial advantage such as a large 
population size (i.e. large potential consumer market) have been able to attract all 
footloose industry once a self-reinforcing trend process has set in: given that firms 
want-to locate close to their main market, they move to the location with the initially 
largest population size (everything else being equal). But-population size-is largest 
exactly where most industry is located (Krugman, 1991)5. Conversely, a location 
which has been at an initial disadvantage would lose out altogether and would become 
entirely dependent on imported manufactured goods. Given that such a location can-  
no longer rely on its own-market-size to attract firms-as it could when trade costs 
were higher, the national/intermediate government-has to restore to specific economic 
policies to do just that.
However, most of the ‘new economic geography’ literature so far has not given 
the role of policy makers and other large scale agents in shaping the economic 
landscape the deserved attention: ‘[T]he future research agenda for economic
4 See also the Financial Times (1995b) for a survey on business locations in Europe.
5 This story requires labour mobility. Venables (1996) generates a similar story by assuming vertical 
linkages between firms.
geography is vast... The question of what regional integration does to industrial 
concentration is important, but as yet it is not well understood. Even more detailed 
questions such as what are the best policies in order to help disadvantaged regions are 
even more pressing (at least in Europe) but are even less well understood. There is 
much informal reasoning and ‘common wisdom’ (e.g. the central government should 
build more physical infrastructures such as roads and telecommunications systems, and 
promote more investment in human capital by building and improving schools). In fact 
these policies have failed dismally in some cases (southern Italy) but have enjoyed 
some success in others (Ireland and Portugal)’ (Baldwin, 1994, p. 46) and also Fujita 
and Thisse: ‘[T]he question of regional convergence/divergence has at last received 
the attention it has long deserved... However models are still too preliminary to draw 
strong policy recommendations... In particular, we do~not know much about the 
circumstances that lead a region to recover. In the real world, we observe that some 
regions are successful in their economic revival while others seem to decline 
inexorably. It is not always clear why such different evolutions arise... So far we have 
very few insights about what could well be a "good" infrastructure policy in the 
context of a spatial economy’-(Fujita and Thisse, 1995, p. 41).
Several policies are feasible and are used by governments-to attract firmsr-tax- 
holidays (see for instance Mintz, 1989), guaranteed public demand in the form of 
specific government procurement programmes (Trionfetti, 1996)6, a reduction in ‘red 
tape’ to improve government efficiency and business conditions (Gore, 1993), the 
creation of regional development agencies (Council of-Europe, 1985)7, and the 
provision of local productive public goods are just-some of them: In this chapter we 
want to shed some light on the observations made by Baldwin: why is it that regional
6 The Commission of the European Communities notes that public procurement is a powerful economic 
policy to stimulate economic activity (Commission of the European Communities, 1993a).
7 These development agencies have been studied by Bartolome and Spiegel (1997) who find a strong 
positive correlation between state spending on development per worker and state manufacturing 
employment growth.
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policies, such as the provision of physical infrastructures, succeed in attracting firms 
to a region in some cases but not in others?
The provision and/or updating of local public goods such as infrastructure is 
seen as crucial by policy makers for the development of a region and/or to keep it 
competitive. This view is based on many empirical studies (see for instance Biehl, 
1992 and Vickerman, 1990). In Europe, policy makers at different regional levels have 
been engaged in improving the provision of local public goods. Consider the case of 
Eastern Germany: since the unification with West Germany, the German government 
has invested heavily into the improvement of local infrastructure such as 
telecommunications, roads or the railway network8. These investments are considered 
to be necessary to attract private investment into the Eastern German states and to 
support a local industrial base. At an urban level, London and Barcelona can both be 
used as examples: in the former it has been argued that improving existing 
infrastructure is crucial to maintain London’s position as a world city. The Corporation 
of London and ‘London First/Pride Partnership1-have both argued that especially the 
transport network has to be upgraded to prevent London from losing business to 
competing-cities such as Paris or Frankfurt, suggesting a £ 23 billion investment 
programme until the year 2010 (The London First/Pride Partnership, 1994 and 
Financial Times, 1995a)9. Barcelona is a case in which massive investments into its 
local public goods have helped to transform the city from a declining industrial 
location to one of the most dynamic regions of Southern Europe (Commission of the 
European Communitie&r4993d). On an inner-city level, the provision of local public 
goods (e.g. The Docklands Light Railway, The Limehouse Link, the Jubilee Line
It has been estimated that DM 500 billion are necessary to bring the Eastern German infrastructure up 
to the West German level (Riirup, 1993). Note that the financing of these infrastructure projects can be 
done directly through the Federal budget or indirectly as in the case of telecommunications for which 
Deutsche Telekom, then a state monopoly, was in charge.
The Corporation of London is the administration of the City of London in which most of the financial 
sector is based. ‘London First/Pride Partnership’ is an association of London’s industry which promotes 
London as a business location.
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extension) has been fundamental to the eventual success of the London Docklands 
development.
It has to be noted though that the above mentioned examples have all benefited 
from outside financing of the projects. The states of Eastern Germany have received 
transfer payments from Western Germany and the European Union as a whole, 
Barcelona received most of its infrastructure during the preparation of the 1992 
Summer Olympics which were a national event. The London Docklands Development 
Corporation which was in charge of the development in the Docklands area was 
mainly publicly funded. Generally, countries and regions within the European Union 
and similar political environments can rely on outside assistance in stimulating 
manufacturing production and growth in their location. ‘... [Fjollowing the signing of 
the Single European Act, the Treaty of Rome was amended to include a ... section 
devoted to ‘Economic and Social Cohesion’ (EEC Title V). The objective of the EC 
in regional policy terms are made clear:
‘In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the_strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion.
In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions (Article 130a EEC)’ (Cole 
and Cole, 1993, p. 224). One way of achieving economic and social cohesion has been 
through labour mobility from the backward to the more industrialised regions. Another 
way has been through transfers which provide financial assistance by the more 
advanced regions to the more backward regions. (Cole and Cole, 1993). In addition 
to national policies, the ‘EC Structural Funds’ were one of the instruments created to 
achieve the goals: over 80 per cent of the Regional Development Fund were used to 
fund infrastructure projects (Vickerman, 1991, p. 1), with the overall transfers 
representing up to 3 per cent of Gross National Product of certain benefiting member 
states (Christopherson, 1994). In 1992, the Maastricht treaty put these Union policies 
on a new base: in addition to the Structural Funds which were to receive 161 Billion
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Ecu between 1993 and 1999, the European Cohesion Fund was set up to cofinance 
projects especially in the poorest member states Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1993b)10.
We want to consider the extreme case though in which a region is self- 
financing its local public good provision11. This assumption is admittedly unrealistic 
as no region is fully independent of outside financial support12. However, the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland, Bulgaria and 
Hungary (Baldwin ,1994), Norway and Switzerland in Western Europe, the NICs, and 
also countries as diverse as South Africa or Argentina might come close to meeting 
this assumption. However it can be argued that the forces we want to study also exist 
- albeit to a lesser extent - in countries and regions which do not depend entirely on 
self-financing. Countries and regions within that group still complement outside 
financial support with ‘local’ policies. In doing so, we follow Dicken who 
\..[d]emonstrate(s) some of the ways in which nation states contribute to the shaping 
— and reshaping_of the global economic system. All states are engaged in a broad variety 
of trade, investment and industry polices; only the degree of involvement varies from 
one nation to another’ (Dicken, 1992, p. 186). Note that throughout the discussion the 
main objective of a regional government is the ‘industrialisation’ of its economy, i.e. 
raising the fraction of the labour force employed in the industrial sector. We thus 
interpret industrialisation as the main characteristic of development. This economic 
policy is called ‘smokestack chasing’ in the literature (see for instance Bartik, 1994), 
the prime goal being to induce manufacturing firms from outside the region to 
relocate in the region (Bartolome and Spiegel, 1997). Other - and equally valid -
10 For a very detailed country by country survey on regional incentives available for industrial and 
business relocation in Europe see Yuill et al. (1994).
11 We relax this extreme assumption in the last section of Chapter two.
12 Every country/region receives some form of outside financial support. It is either integrated into a
trading bloc (e.g. the EU), part of a country (e.g. the states of the United States), or they receive
financial support from other international institutions such as the World Bank.
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interpretations can be based on the increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, the reduction of underemployment or unemployment, and the reduction of 
income disparities in regions etc. However, the framework developed rules out these 
interpretations and focuses entirely on the industrialisation aspect.
Given that the above mentioned economic policies have to be financed in some 
way, the question of the optimal size of the public sector arises13. The UK 
government, for example, has promised to reduce its public sector share to below 40 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product - claiming that this is necessary for a dynamic 
economy. ‘[T]he UK is unique in having attributed a magical significance to the 40 
per cent figure. But the equation of good government with small government is a 
global phenomenon... To focus on the sheer size of government is to ignore ... what 
matters about a given chunk-of-public spending is not its size, but the way it is spent’ 
(Financial Times, 1997). This implies that a government could justify a large public 
sectof-as4ong as it is efficient in the way it spends its tax revenues: ‘[EJven in those 
sectors which-have remained largely under state control, the government ... believes 
that ... reforms have made them more competitive.it follows ... that the 11 Vi per cent 
- o f  GDP spent on public education and health next year will have a very different 
impact on national economic efficiency than the 11 per cent of GDP the government 
spent on them in 1979’ (Financial Times, 1997). These-general observations are likely 
to be valid also for the more specific policies designed to attract firms. What matters 
are not only the benefits offered to the firms (in the form of a high quality and 
efficient local public provision) but also the cost involved.-And these costs depend on 
the efficiency level within the public sector.
13 Rodrik (1996) tests the hypothesis that the size of the public sector in a country depends positively on 
the degree of the economy’s openness to trade. He finds supportive evidence from a large cross-section 
of countries. As a possible explanation, he proposes the following: ‘[M]ore open economies have greater 
exposure to the risks emanating from turbulences in world markets. We can view large government 
spending in such countries as performing an insulation function, insofar as the government sector is the 
"safe" sector ... relative to other activities’ (Rodrik, 1996, p. 13).
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Chapter two of this thesis analyses in which way economic policies can affect 
the distribution of firms in space - as seen from the viewpoint of a backward region 
which tries to attract firms from a more developed region. Do well formulated and 
executed policies always succeed in attracting firms? If not, what are the causes for 
failure? Has deeper economic integration made it easier or more difficult for a 
backward region to construct successful policies? In order to answer these questions, 
we introduce a public sector into a standard economic geography model of the type 
advocated by Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996). Surprisingly few 
models have attempted to incorporate public sectors into these economic geography 
models. Martin and Rogers (1995), Trionfetti (1996) and Spatafora (1997) are notable 
exceptions. However only the former are concerned with public goods provision, the 
other two are interested in public procurement programmes (Trionfetti) and trade 
_ policies and foreign direct investment (Spatafora). We analyse which factors are likely 
to affect the success rate of industrial policies aimed at attracting mobile firms.
We assume that the public sector’s output has a direct and cost-cutting effect 
on the manufacturing firms located in the region (see for instance Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely, 1996)14, i.e. the higher the quality of the public sector output (such as public 
transport, education or health service), the lower the production cost of the industry. 
Following McMillan ^ who defines ‘[p]ublic intermediate goods are goods such that the 
whole amount supplied enters the production functions of several firms’ (McMillan, 
1979, p. 294), local public goods-are necessary for the production of an industrial 
sector which produces goods for local consumption and export. Specifically, we 
assume ‘factor-augmenting public inputs’ which improve the productivity of private 
factors (Feehan, 1989). The provision of the local public good is financed by a tax on 
the immobile factor of production - labour.
14 For empirical evidence see for example Morrison and Schwartz (1992).
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We find that the size and efficiency of the public sector are two important 
factors determining whether the regional government can induce manufacturing firms 
to move to its region. However, the economic forces as discussed in the ‘new 
economic geography literature’ are also very important. We can therefore offer further 
theoretical support to the empirical observations made: ‘[T]he results of a very large 
number of functions estimated ... can be ... summarized as follows: ...
The estimated contribution of infrastructure to regional development declines if the 
other potentiality factors, location, agglomeration and sectoral structure are explicitly 
introduced into the production functions. Infrastructure nevertheless remains 
significant. This supports the theoretically derived proposition that infrastructure is one 
of the main determinants o f regional development, but that the other determinants 
exert significant influence, too. Regional development, therefore, cannot be based on 
infrastructure policy alone’ (Biehl, 1992, p. 14).
The increased ‘interconnectedness’ of economies in thepost war era has also 
presented a changing framework for national and intermediate level governments in 
which loTormalise and pursue domestic economic policies. This ‘interconnectedness’ 
can arise through several channels: first through labour mobility, second through" 
capital mobility_(e.g. firm relocation), and third through trade of goods15. The post w ar 
era has brought increased mobility in all three areas and it thus that policies which 
have been primarily targeted at the domestic economy - including the provision of 
local public goods - are now having stronger effects- on other economies.
Consider labour mobility: the question of whether independent jurisdictions 
oversupply or undersupply local public goods has attracted much attention: 
‘[Pjersuasive arguments can be given both sides of the issue. A typical argument for 
undersupply would run as follows: Local communities will tend to discourage 
expansionary projects because such projects will encourage in-migration and increase
15 The second channel forms the basis for Chapter two of this thesis.
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congestion to current residents... A contrasting argument for oversupply can be given. 
Communities, in attracting residents, can bid tax revenue away from others; the extra 
tax revenue can be used to spread the costs of a given provision of public goods more 
thinly over the original population...’ (Starrett, 1980)16. Labour mobility also provided 
the foundations for Tiebout’s (1956) famous response to Samuelson (1954). Tiebout 
argued that mobile citizens would reveal their preferences regarding the provision of 
public goods by their choice of residence from a wide selection of jurisdictions. Given 
that there exists a large number of jurisdictions, so that citizens would find one which 
offers exactly their preferred revenue and expenditure scheme, efficiency can be 
reestablished even with public goods17.
The effects of capital mobility on the provision of local public goods has also 
been extensively studied by the tax (fiscal) competition literature. The focus of 
attention has been on independent jurisdictions and governments which compete 
against each other to attract mobile capital (i.e. footloose firms) to their respective 
regions. It has been shown that in such a competitive environment, tax rates on capital 
are set too low and that the resulting tax revenues are not high enough to finance the 
optimal amount of local public goods for which the government is responsible. There 
is thus a sub-optimal”provision of local public goods: ‘[W]ith the economy’s total 
capital stock assumed to be fixed, the lost investment from a higher tax in one 
jurisdiction represents a positive externality, because-capital becomes more plentiful 
in other jurisdictions... A tax-induced capital outflow is a cost from the single 
jurisdiction's viewpoint, but not from the-entire economy’s viewpoint’ (Wilson, 1995, 
p. 333). This literature is vast and includes work by Wilson (1984)* Wildasin-(1987, 
1989), Wildasin and Wilson (1991), Oates and Schwab (1988), and Bucovetsky
16 The ‘theory of local public goods’ deals specifically with issues such as the determination of the 
allocation of the population among different communities (see for instance Stiglitz, 1977). Wildasin 
(1987) also offers a survey on the theory of local public economics (see also Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980 and Myles, 1995 on that issue).
17 Samuelson (1954) claimed that citizens would have an incentive to underreport their willingness to pay 
for public goods so that these goods would be undersupplied in equilibrium.
21
(1991). Wilson (1995), for example, combines labour mobility with capital mobility, 
whereas Hoyt (1991) introduces taxation on immobile factors of production such as 
land. Policy coordination between the competing jurisdictions is seen as one way to 
solving this problem. Generally a higher level of government is suggested which could 
coordinate lower-tier economic polices. However, this approach has been criticised for 
not taking into account the complex interactions between the different levels of 
government (see for instance Keen and Kotsogiannis (1996) and Keen (1996)). It also 
raises the question why economic policies are not pursued by the higher-tier 
government in the first place.
It seems surprising that most of the theoretical literature dealing with local 
public goods provision and taxation issues considers the importance of capital and 
labour mobility, but not the trade in goods. As argued above, the volume of trade in 
goods between industrial countries has increased vastly in the last decades, i.e. 
between countries which are relatively similar in their economic structures. This fact 
can only be explained by intra-industry trade, which has been defined as ‘[t]he 
simultaneous export and import of goods belonging to the same industry’ (Grimwade, 
1989, p. 89)18. Indeed, the share of intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade 
in manufactured goods in 1986 has been estimated to be 80.4 per cent for France, 79.1 ~ 
p e r c e n te r  the UK, 65.4 per cent for West Germany and 60.7 per cent for the United 
- States -{Grimwade, 1989). These observations were the motivation for the ‘new 
international trade’ literature which was established in the late 1970s (see for instance 
Krugman, 1979, 1980). However, its focus of attention has been towards strategic 
trade policies and related issues (Erander and Spencer, 1984, Eaton and Grossman, 
1986, and Venables, 1987), and not so much on policies which have a distinctly 
domestic emphasis such as local public goods provision.
18 For an informal discussion on intra-industry trade see Grimwade (1989), pages 126-138.
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Chapter three of this thesis analyses the effects of the increased volume of 
intra-industry trade on domestic public goods provision and taxation policies - thus 
bridging the two separate strands of literature which have been developed in the public 
economics and the international trade fields. To do so, Chapter three incorporates 
aspects of both strands of literature and also draws heavily on the framework 
developed in Chapter two such as ‘factor-augmenting’ local public goods and taxation 
on labour income in a two region setup. We find that increased economic integration 
(as reflected by a fall in trade costs) raises the level of potential ‘spillovers’ of 
domestic economic policies into the foreign economy. The externality studied here is 
quite different though to the ones mentioned above: the benefit of local public goods 
provision is embedded in the industry’s output which is sold in both the domestic and 
the foreign market. Closer economic integration raises the volume of intra-industry 
trade and it is thus that more of the benefit is ‘exported’ to the foreign region. The 
consequences are similar to the ones described by Wilson in that ‘...[0]utflow is a cost 
from the single jurisdiction’s viewpoint, but not from the entire economy’s viewpoint’ 
(Wilson, 1994, p. 333). Noting that the tax burden on the domestic citizens-does not 
vary with changes in economic integration, we can find that a regionaf-gavernment has 
an incentive to underprovide the local public good - a tendency which-becomes the 
stronger, the deeper the level of economic integration. Wildasin (1993) is closest in 
spirit to the model presented-here: he studies the effects of tax and expenditure 
policies in one jurisdiction on the wages and welfare level in another jurisdiction when 
these are linked through inter-industry trade. We conclude that closer economic 
integration has to go hand in hand with closer economic and political cooperation to 
yield the full benefit of the former.
Chapter four of this thesis focuses on a lower tier of policy making: we study 
local government and its policies in the context of urban areas. Urban economics is 
the branch of economic theory which deals specifically with the questions and 
problems arising in urban areas (see for instance Henderson, 1985 and Fujita, 1989). 
Much of the basic theory of urban economics is based on the pioneering work of
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Alonso (1964) who introduced the concept of ‘bid-rent functions’ into an urban 
framework: assuming the existence of only one business district (generally located in 
the urban centre and therefore called the central business district - CBD) in an 
otherwise featureless plain, identical citizens maximise their utility by choosing over 
their residential location and consumption goods. Amenities such as the distance to the 
centrally-located workplace are ‘location-specific’ and create a heterogeneity in the 
otherwise homogeneous plain. Citizens are prepared to bid the highest rent for the 
most desirable location. In the simplest model, where distance is the only ‘location- 
specific’ amenity, a location is the more desirable, the closer it is to the CBD and 
therefore yields the highest land rent. This is because such a location minimises the 
commuting cost which has to be incurred by workers (Straszheim, 1987)19. Firms face 
a similar problem within the CBD and are prepared to pay the highest rent for the 
most desirable location within it - generally the centre as that contains the central 
transportation node of the urban area. This simple setup generates a falling land rent 
gradient ^ away from the centre, a result which is generally supported by empirical 
evidence (see for example Coulson, 1991). The spatial equilibrium configuration of 
the urban area thus depends on the optimising behaviour of the two types of atomistic 
agents: residents and firms20.
Building on this simple framework, many modifications and extensions have 
been made (Henderson, 1985). Here we want to concentrate on the extensions which 
are of relevance to Chapter four. The first one is the introduction of land use zoning21. 
Generally it has been argued that negative externalities can arise duer to ‘non- 
conforming’ land use. ^Technological, externalities such as pollution created by the
19 An alternative interpretation is given by Beckmann (1974) and Henderson (1985) who argue that such 
a location would minimise the ‘foregone’ leisure time due to commuting.
20 Such a setup also endogenously determines the size of the CBD: firms and citizens compete for the 
same plots of land, and the highest bidder receives the right to use it. It can be shown that at a given 
distance x from the centre, citizens are willing to pay a higher land rent than firms. This distance x then 
marks the edge of the CBD and the beginning of the residential area (Alonso, 1964).
21 For a survey on land use zoning, see for example Pogodzinski and Sass (1990).
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industrial sector in the CBD can be one of them (see for instance Stull, 1974)22. The 
racial and social mixture of a neighbourhood can also be considered to be a ‘location- 
specific’ amenity and can also lead to ‘non-conforming’ land use (Becker, 1957). In 
these cases it can be shown that land use zoning can raise the welfare level of the 
local citizens. Zoning, however, requires a large agent such as a local government 
which can act in the interest of the atomistic agents.
Second, the assumption of mono-centricity has been relaxed. By doing so, 
observations such as the move of manufacturing or services to the urban periphery, 
or the retail sector’s decision to follow the suburbanisation trend of its customers have 
been taken care of (Straszheim, 1987)23. Two approaches have been taken: the first has 
been to assume the existence of a second business district (see for example Rubinfeld, 
1978 and Yinger, 1990). The second approach has been to endogenously generate the 
possibility of multi-centric outcomes. Fujita and Ogawa (1982) treat the spatial 
configuration as the outcome of interactions between firms and residents. Firms favour 
agglomeration, whereas residents want to live as close as possible to their workplace 
in order to minimise commuting cost. The consumption of and competition for land 
works against agglomeration though. Fujita..and Ogawa show that monocentric and 
non-monocentric outcomes are both possible - which one represents the equilibrium 
configuration depends on the parameter-values chosen. Note that in both approaches, 
the equilibrium configuration is-determined by the atomistic agents only.
Third, the literature has been extended to include a second type-of large scale 
agent in addition to the local government: land-developers (Henderson, 1974). 
Building on this work, the problem for the land-developer when to develop land from 
non-urban to urban use has been studied (Arnott and Lewis, 1979), Bar-Ilan and 
Strange (1996) consider the effects of the uncertainty created by time lags between the
22 In that case the citizens living closest to the CBD are the most affected.
23 These two trends have, respectively, led to the creation of industrial/business parks and out-of-town 
shopping malls and warehouses.
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application and completion of development. Anderson (1993) analyses the effects of 
externalities created by such developments. Henderson and Slade (1993) present a 
model in which land-developers give rise to non-monocentric cities.
The importance of land-developers in shaping the economic landscape has been 
discussed only recently. Becker and Henderson (1996) analyse the importance of land- 
developers in the formation process of cities. They argue that so far this formation 
process has been approached in two different ways in the literature: ‘[A]t one extreme 
(Henderson, 1974), there are large agents in national land markets ... who can 
orchestrate large scale movements of people. At the other extreme ... (Krugman, 
1993), large agents are non-existent and cities form through "self-organisation"’ 
(Becker and Henderson, 1996, p. 3). Rauch (1993) argues that business park 
developers are under specific circumstances necessary to encourage firms to move 
from an old and high-cost site to a new and low-cost site. Due to agglomeration forces 
within the industry, firms can be locked-in at the old site, preventing an individual 
firm from moving. By differentiating the rental price of land over time, the land- 
developer can create incentives for individual firms to break away from the industrial 
cluster and move to the new location. Once one firm has moved, more firms will 
follow, eventually leading to the complete shifLof economic activity to the new site. 
It is thus that the land-developer is able to influence the spatial distribution of 
economic activity. On an even larger scale, Henderson and Mitra (1996) consider the 
creation of ‘edge cities’ by land-developers. These edge cities are self-contained towns 
with business districts, residential areas etc. They study the optimal location and 
capacity choice faced by the developer, assuming that the traditional city’s capacity 
remains fixed.
The model presented in Chapter four builds on some of the extensions 
mentioned above. In the first section of the model, we present a fixed sized and closed 
(i.e. there is no migration) urban area with one central business district in which 
residents and monopolistically competitive firms compete for land. It is shown that
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land use zoning is welfare improving over the market outcome not because of the 
problem of ‘non-conforming’ land use but because of the pecuniary externality created 
by the monopolistically competitive firms.
In the following section we assume the existence of a second business district 
which is located out-of-town. This extension enables us to analyse another economic 
development of international importance: in addition to the above mentioned global 
changes which have affected the location of economic activity across countries or 
regions, there have also been changes which have affected the location of economic 
activity within urban areas. Historically, most economic activities have been based 
within the urban area but the post war era has seen major relocations. Manufacturing 
industry, for example, has shifted production out of urban areas to peripheral 
locations24. Retailing has also undergone major changes, and the 1960s and 1970s have 
witnessed the ‘retail revolution’. Retailing, for example, was characterised by small, 
family-owned shops which were located in the town or city centres. These traditional 
centres were the dominant if not the only shopping location. The rise of car ownership 
and changing demographic patterns have led to a fundamental restructuring of the 
retail trade: previously unattractive out-of-town sites have become attractive retailing 
locations, competing with the traditional town centres for shops and costumers: This: ~ 
development started in the 1950s in the United States, establishing itself as a m ajor- 
economic trend in other industrialised countries such as France and Germany by the 
early 1970s (Walker, 1996).
The relocation of industry to peripheral locations and the shift of retailing 
activity has been helped and encouraged by the development of appropriate sites in 
the form of industrial/business parks and out-of-town shopping centres and 
warehouses. It is through these sites that land-developers have been involved in 
shaping the economic landscape of urban areas (see for instance The Financial Times,
24 It is best here to think of light industrial production. Changes in production techniques, logistics and 
improved telecommunications infrastructure have encouraged many firms to relocate.
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1996). Chapter four of this thesis argues that the rise of land-developers (i.e. a large 
scale agent) has affected the framework in which local governments - previously the 
only large scale agent - pursue their local economic policies. Specifically we ask in 
which way land use zoning policies have been affected. To answer this question we 
consider the dual-centric urban area and initially assume that all land is owned and 
developed by the local residents. This assumption implies that all land rents are fed 
back into the local economy. Even though extreme, it can be argued that this 
assumption is appropriate for small to medium sized towns and cities in which 
absentee landlords play a minor role. We derive the optimal land use policy to be 
followed by the local government. This case is compared with a scenario in which the 
out-of-town site is developed and managed by an outside land-developer which 
transfers the rental income to its absentee headquarters25. Undeniably even small to 
medium sized towns and cities have been affected by the above mentioned changes, 
with many of these out-of-town developments being huge compared to the size of the 
traditional town centre. We show in which way optimal local economic policies are 
affected by the existence of absentee landlords and the resulting outflow of rental 
income.
Chapter five of this thesis provides a brief summary of the conclusions drawn 
in the individual chapters.
25 As argued above, many land developers operate nationally or even internationally, e.g. Arlington as a 
business park developer in the UK (see The Financial Times, 1996). On the retail side, the big retail 
chains such as Tesco, Sainsbury etc come to mind in a UK context.
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Chapter 2
The effects of industrial policy on the 
location decisions of firms
30
1. Introduction
One striking phenomenon observed in the world is the uneven spatial 
distribution of economic activity. Industrial production tends to agglomerate in 
particular regions, leaving other parts of a country or continent relatively less 
developed. In Europe, for example, most economic activity is located in the so-called 
‘European banana’ which stretches from England’s southeast to the plains of northern 
Italy via France, Germany and the Benelux countries (Cole and Cole, 1993). A similar 
observation can be made for the United States where industrial production used to be 
and still is concentrated in the ‘manufacturing belt’ of the northeast (Krugman, 1991a).
The early 1990s witnessed the revival of interest into that phenomenon. 
Krugman (1991) demonstrates how a country (or more generally a region) could 
endogenously become differentiated into an industrialised ‘core’ and an agricultural 
‘periphery’. Assuming economies of scale in production, manufacturing firms try to 
minimise the number of production sites they have and tend to locate these in the 
region with the highest consumer demand in order to minimise transportation costs. 
However, consumer demand is highest where the most manufacturing workers (and 
hence firms) are located. This circular causation argument is then the main force 
behind the agglomeration trend of firms. Krugman’s initial model requires inter­
regional labour mobility to generate these results. Venables (1996) argues that 
vertically-linked industries could generate similar outcomes: vertically-linked industrial 
clusters generate their own demand as downstream firms demand intermediate inputs 
from upstream firms - establishing a market independent of the final consumer market. 
Upstream firms thus want to be close to the downstream firms, a market access effect. 
Moreover, the more upstream firms are located in one region, the lower would be the 
price index for intermediate inputs for the downstream firms in that region, a cost 
effect. Venables concludes that vertically-linked industries could fully agglomerate in
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one region and serve the other region by exporting to it, without the need of labour 
mobility26.
The results derived in these models depend entirely on the decisions taken by 
utility-maximising consumers/workers and profit-maximising firms, i.e. atomistic 
agents. However, large scale agents such as local or national governments also try to 
influence the geographical distribution of economic activity - a fact generally ignored 
in this literature. Trionfetti provides one of the few exceptions: he introduces public 
procurement schemes into the standard core-periphery model of Krugman (1991): 
‘[G]overnments are assumed to collect taxes and provide publicly an impure public 
good ... Many types of infrastructures (such as electricity networks or 
telecommunication) and, to some extent law and order, could be comprised within this 
type of public good. It is assumed that the presence of this good does not affect the 
production decisions’ (Trionfetti, 1996, pp. 2-3). He compares an "American" style 
scheme with a "European" one. In the former, he assumes that the ‘[SJtates 
expenditure follows the geographical location of producers precisely as private 
expenditure does. Governments do not use (this scheme) as a policy instrument and 
therefore government procurement under this scheme does not affect location 
decisions’. In comparison, European governments are assumed to spend their 
expenditure on domestic-firms: ‘[U]nder the "European" scheme the geographical 
allocation of government expenditure is dynamically independent from the location of 
producers’ (Trionfetti, 1996, p. 10). Closer in spirit to the model presented here is a - 
model developed by Martin and Rogers. They ‘...[p]ropose a new way to model 
different types of public infrastructure,, which allows us to analyze its impact on trade 
patterns, industrial location, and welfare... Poor infrastructure imposes costs on trade 
within and between countries... We differentiate between infrastructure that facilitates 
domestic trade (...) and infrastructure which facilitates international trade (...)... This
26 This result depends on the underlying economic parameters, such as the degree of economies of scale, 
the magnitude of the linkages between industries and the size of the final consumer demand in the 
regions. The importance of these and other factors is discussed later in the chapter.
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way of modelling public infrastructure departs from earlier models, such as Arrow and 
Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990) in which infrastructure is an input in the production 
function. These models cannot address the role played by infrastructure in regional 
integration because they do not capture the function of infrastructure in facilitating 
trade within and between countries’ (Martin and Rogers, 1995b, pp. 336-339)27.
It is generally acknowledged that governments want to have a ‘fair share’ of 
industrial production in their region and introducing policies aimed at attracting mobile 
industries is thus a major issue for every government28. Past and current UK policy, 
for example, has been to set up so-called regional development agencies which have 
successfully attracted many companies (e.g. the Welsh Development Agency)29. The 
UK generally proved to be one of the most popular destinations for capital investment 
in the 1980s and 1990s: over the period 1984-1992 the UK was the most attractive 
market for foreigners, receiving almost 43 per cent of direct investment made by 
foreign countries in the EU (Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1995). Many companies invested heavily into production facilities in 
the UK. One reason for doing so has been the size of the domestic UK market itself. 
Locating in the UK also meant that the other main European markets could be 
supplied at relatively low cost. In a recent study on location factors and location 
decisions it was argued that: ‘[0 ]f the individual factors, proximity to markets was by 
far the most significant ... Although access to the EC market overall is the most 
important factor, many companies also like to have a strong national market for their 
production ... Proximity to major customers is another key factor at the country level. 
Some companies, particularly those supplying components had invested in a country 
in order to increase market share ... The availability of inputs is relevant as both a
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See also Spatafora (1997) for another exception. He introduces multinational firms, foreign direct 
investment and trade policies such as tariffs into a two region core-periphery model.
It is expected that mobile firms create new jobs and thus help to combat the unemployment problem 
which exists in many regions. This issue is, however, not discussed in this model.
See Economists Advisory Group Ltd (1994) or Price et al. (1994) for case studies.
country and a region factor ... The development of a specialized component-producing 
economy also attracts new investment in the end-product industry. This reflects the 
industry linkages in the automotive and the electronics industry’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1993, pp. 77-99). In the case of the motor industry (e.g. 
Nissan at Sunderland in 1986), this process has actually happened: car components 
manufacturers have located close to the car manufactures which in turn have 
reinvested into new facilities due to the close proximity of components suppliers. This 
is the process which has been analysed by Venables (1996).
More generally though, there is a debate among political parties on the role of 
governments in this context: on the one hand it is argued that a small public sector is 
important for a dynamic economy30, on the other hand it is claimed that more and not 
less public involvement is required to attract industries, referring to improved 
education or public infrastructure standards (The Economist, 1995). These suggestions 
are in line with observations made by the European Commission: ‘[I]n the 1980s, 
public policy to attract mobile investment was focused on the development of ar 
favourable investment climate .« As-... the location choice of companies hinges upon 
production factors, public policy was designed to improve such operational attributes 
as the availability of labour ... Training schemes were initiated to enhance the quality 
of the work-force...’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1993, p. 77).
The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on the above mentioned 
debate of whether a small or a large public sector is better suited to attract firms. We 
want to analyse in which way the ability to attract firms is affected by the size and 
efficiency level (see page 18 of this thesis) of the public sector. The objective of this 
chapter is therefore to formalise the role of the public sector in influencing the 
distribution of economic activity in space, focusing on the two activities of tax raising 
and local public good provision. We want to concentrate on the case of a backward
30 See page 18 of this thesis’ introduction.
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region which tries to attract manufacturing industry into its region. We analyse which 
policy mix (i.e. low taxation and a low level of public good provision versus high 
taxation and a high level of public good provision) is most likely to succeed in 
attracting industries. The chapter then goes on to investigate which other economic 
factors determine the location of firms in space and shows that even the ‘best’ policy 
mix may not be good enough to attract firms into a region. This allows us to analyse 
why such policies may have failed - addressing some of the points made by Baldwin 
(see page 14 of the introduction).
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section formalises the regional 
economies and policy instruments available to the regional governments. Section 3.1 
analyses the agglomeration forces within the industries as long as the governments are 
‘symmetrically active’ in the sense that they follow the same policies with the same 
efficiency levels. We study the ability of a backward region’s government to attract 
firms in such a case. Section 3.2 assumes that government activity is asymmetric in 
the sense that the regional governments might choose different policies or have 
different efficiency levels in implementing them. Once again we study whether a 
backward peripheral region could attract firms from an ‘industrialised’ core. We then 
go on to do some comparative statics, analysing the effects of several different 
parameter values on the attractiveness of the backward region. Section 4 briefly - 
outlines the implications of relaxing several assumptions made throughout this chapter. 
Section 5 concludes. The appendices derive-some of the-results presented in this 
chapter.
2. A formal model with government activity
We imagine a world consisting of two regions, Home (H) and Foreign (F). In 
this section we describe one region’s economy, noting that the same setup applies to 
the other region as well. The region consists of many identical citizens and a 
government which tries to attract firms by following a tax raising/local public good
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provision policy. Citizens provide the only factor of production, labour L, which is 
normalised to unity. We impose the restriction that labour is regionally immobile, i.e. 
there is no migration between the two regions, however labour can freely move 
between the economy’s sectors. Individuals have identical endowments of one unit of 
labour and can either be employed in the public sector - in which case they provide 
the local public good - or in the private sector. The private sector consists of two 
industries: the first industry produces subject to constant returns to scale (CRS) a ‘y- 
type’ good which we use as the numeraire31, the second industry produces subject to 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) manufactured goods - denoted by ‘x’ - which can 
be used for final consumption or as an intermediate input in the production of other 
manufactures. The labour force is split into these three sectors so that:
L + L x+ L =  1, (2.1)
where Lg is the fraction of workers in the public sector, Lx is the fraction of workers 
in the IRS-sector and Ly is the fraction of workers in the CRS-sector.
2.1 Private demand and utility
Let us assume that all individuals have identical consumption preferences and 
that a representative citizen spends his/her income on the numeraire and on an 
aggregate X of manufactured goods with Cobb-Douglas preferences. The indirect 
utility V of a consumer has the following form:
w  (1 - t )
^ v=—  1 ,  (2.2)
' P (l 'y)pJ
where ws is the nominal gross wage in the sectors with s = x, y and g. t is the income 
tax rate with 0 < t < 1 which is imposed by the regional government to raise tax
31 In the economic geography literature the CRS-sector is normally interpreted as the agricultural sector.
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revenues, so that ws (1 - t) is the disposable income, y  is the fraction of disposable 
income spent on the CRS-sector good with 0 < y < l 32, py is the price of the 
numeraire good so that py = 1, and choosing the units of the CRS-good so that one 
unit of output requires exactly one unit of labour input we also have wy = 1. Trade 
between the two regions is possible, but only at a cost: whereas the CRS-sector good 
can be costlessly transported between the two regions, shipment of the IRS-sector 
goods involves cost of the ‘iceberg’ type: of every unit of an x-good shipped, only a 
fraction 1 / T - with T > 1 - arrives in the other region and the rest melts away, t  
represents the transportation cost of the manufactured goods between the two regions 
and reflects natural and/or artificial barriers to trade such as tariffs. Following Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), the price index for the aggregate of manufactured goods is given 
by:
P=[*P* ~0> , <2-3)
where the asterisk denotes the variables of the ‘other region’, n and n* are the number 
of firms in the two regions, whereas pxi and p*^ are the prices charged by an 
individual firm i in the two regions. Furthermore a  - which is larger than one - is the 
elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of the manufactured good and' 
thus reflects the degree of economies of scale which could be exploited by a firm. It 
can be seen from (2.3) that a larger regional economy, as reflected by a higher n, 
would support a lower price index P.
2.2 The public sector
Turning to the public sector, it is assumed that its budget is always balanced 
and that all of the tax revenues are spent on hiring citizens. These citizens are then 
employed to provide some form of public good which is productive in nature fo r  the
32 This assumption guarantees that goods from both private sectors are always demanded.
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\IRS-manufacturing sector and required to transform ‘raw’ labour L into the input 
factor M (for Modified labour)33. As stated on page 19 of the introduction, we follow 
McMillan in assuming that ‘[p]ublic intermediate goods are goods such that the whole 
amount supplied enters the production functions of several firms’ (McMillan, 1979, 
p. 294). It is thus that the number of firms over which the public good is spread does 
not affect the benefit of provision to an individual firm; what matters is the level of 
provision. We assume that the level of public good provision is a function of the tax 
revenues collected by the government. We make three simple assumptions: first, 
without any tax revenues, the amount of public good provided must be zero. Second, 
the higher the tax revenues, the more of the public good can be provided. Third, we 
want to rule out that the amount of modified labour M can exceed the amount of 
"raw" labour L - whatever the level of tax revenues. This captures the idea of 
transformational loss. We could, for example, imagine that the public sector provides 
a public transport service and that the transformational loss is due to the commuting 
of the labour force to the IRS-sector. The higher the tax revenues, the higher the 
quality of the transport service, leading to less time spent commuting. The best the 
transport service could achieve though would be zero commuting time. Another 
example could be publically financed and provided vocational training. The higher the - ~  
tax revenues, the higher the quality of the courses, and hence the less time a citizen 
would require to gain the skills necessary to work in the IRS-sector.
The total amount of M available in the region therefore depends on the amount^ — -  
of tax revenues T and the amount Lx of labour to be transformed. Generally we can 
write M = G(T,LX), where G is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one with' 
respect to Lx. Note that because of L = ws = l 34, total tax revenues T are identical to 
the tax rate t. We can therefore write:
33 We thus assume that infrastructure enters the production function as an input factor. Note Martin and 
Rogers’ (1995) comment on that approach, as quoted on pages 32 - 33.
34 Due to free labour mobility between sectors, wages are equalised.
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M = G ( T , L ) = g ( T ) L x=g( t ) Lx . (2.4)
The above mentioned assumptions can be stated as follows:
A s s u m p t io n  2.1
(a)
(b)
(c)
g(0) = 0 
g’(t) > 0
g(t) < 1  V t g [0; 1].
The implications of these assumptions will be analysed in the subsequent 
sections. Also note that, due to the free mobility of labour between sectors, the 
government has to pay a wage wg = wy = 1. This implies that the public sector 
employs Lg = t.
2.3 The IR S-m anufacturing sector -
In this section we use several modelling tricks which are generally applied in 
the ‘new economic geography’ literature. Firms in the IRS-sector produce a potentially 
large number of differentiated products of type ‘x’ and use M and a composite 
manufactured intermediate good I as input factors35.1 is assumed to be identical to the 
composite consumption good so that the price indices of the two goods are the same. 
Production in this sector takes place in two distinct steps: in the first, M and I are 
combined with Cobb-Douglas technology to create the required final input factor Z:
(2.5)
35 Recall that on page 36 we labelled the aggregate of ‘x ’-goods as X.
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where p, with 0 < p < 1, represents the share of intermediate inputs in the total costs 
and therefore the degree of vertical linkages in this industry. It can easily be seen that 
for p = 0, vertical linkages would not exist and the final input factor Z would be 
identical to M. In the second step, which requires a fixed cost a  and a constant 
marginal cost P, Z is used in the production of the final good:
Z .= a  + p x ., (2.6)
where xt is the output of an individual firm i. As argued above, I’s price index is 
identical to X ’s price index and is therefore given by (2.3) as well. The cost of one 
unit of modified labour M is given by co where co = (g(t))"1. This follows from the fact 
that the nominal gross wage for labour is fixed by the CRS-sector to be unity and the 
assumption of labour mobility between the sectors: a citizen would only accept to 
work in the IRS-sector if its gross wage equalled that of the CRS-sector. Consider 
again the examples given above: a firm has to compensate its employee for the time 
lost due to commuting or to participating in the training courses. The compensation 
has to be higher, the more time the employee loses. Given the transformation process- 
as described in (2.4), the IRS-sector has to offer co for one unit of modified labour M. 
Using (2.5) and (2.6), we can find that the total cost TC of producing X; is:
TCj =P ^ co(1 ' M)(a  + P xt) . (2.7)
2.4 Solving the model
Given the demand faced by an individual firm and the cost structure from 
(2.7), firms in the IRS-sector charge a mark-up over marginal cost. In equilibrium they 
are identical and use the following pricing rule to maximise their profits36:
36 This follows standard procedure, see Krugman (1991).
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P ix  =P x = t — r r P  p '  " | 1 )  •  ( 2 . 8 )(CT-1)
Free entry and exit into the industry drive profits down to zero, so that the 
equilibrium level of output is the same for every firm:
x . = x = i i ( Q - l ) , (2.9)
H
which can be simplified to x = 1 by letting a  = 1 /  c  and p = (a  - 1) /  a . This 
notation also simplifies the pricing rule as given by (2.8) to px = P^ 1 co (1' M).
The number of firms in the region is determined from an individual firm’s 
demand for the input factor M and the region’s supply of the input factor M. Applying 
Shephard’s lemma to equation (2.7), we can find an individual firm’s demand for M. 
Noting that the supply of M is given by (2.4), we can derive n:
1n =-----
( 1 -F )
M.  (2-10)
Looking at (2.4) and (2.10), we can immediately see that for t = 0 - which 
according to Assumption 2.1 implies g(0) = 0 - the number of IRS-sector firms in the 
region is zero.
To close the model, we finally have to determine M. To do so, let us first of 
all find the region’s expenditure E on IRS-sector goods. We know from (2.2) that 
consumers spend the fraction (1 - y) of their disposable income on IRS-sector goods. 
Given the technology as described in (2.5), IRS-sector firms themselves spend the 
fraction p of their revenues on IRS-sector goods as intermediate inputs. The region’s 
expenditure on IRS-sector goods can then be written as:
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£  = ( 1 - y )(1 - t ) + p n p xx , (2.11)
where the first term on the right-hand side represents the final consumer expenditure 
and the second term on the right-hand side the IRS-sector’s expenditure. Note that E 
does not tell us in which way it is split between domestic and imported IRS-sector 
goods. The next step is to derive total sales of the region’s firms. Demand for an 
individual firm’s product comes from the domestic region and from ‘the other region’. 
In equilibrium, supply has to equal demand for every individual variety produced. This 
can be stated as:
1 =p~c( E P {a~l) + £ ,* P * (a- I)T(1_c)) . (2.12)
It follows that the value of total sales S of all IRS-sector firms equals:
S =n p xl ~a{ E P {a~l )+E*P*{a- l) T(1_a)). (2*13)
The last step is to notice that total income accrued to the modified labour M 
(i.e. co M) in the IRS-sector is the fraction (1 - p) of total sales. We can thus derive 
M to be:
M = (l (2-14)
Equilibrium in the region is then characterised by equations (2.3), (2.8), (2.10), 
(2.11) and (2.14) (and analogous equations for the other region). This set of 
simultaneous equations can be used to find equilibrium values for P, px, n, E and M 
(and P*, px*, n*, E* and M*). We could substitute the price px into (2.3), then use that 
expression in (2.10) to derive n. Once again the price and n have to be used to find 
E, which in turn is necessary to derive M. And M affects n. As can be seen from the 
equations, the policy variable t affects all endogenous variables: for example, the 
marginal cost of production and hence the price px are affected directly and indirectly
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through co and P. Total expenditure E is a function of t directly and indirectly as it is 
determined by disposable income and total sales of the region’s firms. Given 
numerical values it is possible to calculate the equilibrium configuration of the 
economy with two regions. However, in the following section we want to utilise this 
framework to address the questions raised in the introduction.
3. Agglomeration forces in a two region economy
It is a well known result of the ‘new economic geography’ literature that in a 
two-region economy of the type described in section 2, several equilibrium 
configurations can arise. One of these equilibria is characterised when IRS-sector firms 
are evenly split across the two regions. Another equilibrium can exist when all firms 
are located in one of the two regions, supplying their output to both regions. The 
intuition to this second equilibrium is as follows: suppose that there are two locations, 
of which one of them has a ‘headstart’ in the sense that it has initially a few more 
IRS-sector firms than the other region. This implies, from (2.3), that this region’s price 
index for final consumer goods and also for intermediate inputs is lower than in the 
other region. This cost advantage (the so-called forward linkage) is one reason why 
IRS-sector firms would like to agglomerate in that region. The second reason is that 
such firms would also like to be located close to their main markets (the so-called 
backward linkage). Given that final consumer demand is the same across the two 
regions, the main criterion is the size of the IRS-sector cluster itself as that demands 
the x-good as an intermediate input for production. As long as the final consumer 
demand is not too large and can be easily reached from any production site, firms tend 
to agglomerate in the region with the headstart. Note that this crucially depends on the 
accessibility of the two regions and the size of the industrial cluster’s demand relative 
to the final consumer demand.
Which one of these equilibria characterises the economy depends crucially on 
several key parameters of the model. In this section we assume that all firms have
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agglomerated in one region and want to ask under which conditions this constellation 
can be a stable equilibrium. The answer to this determines whether a backward or 
declining region can ever expect to attract industry (again).
A ssu m pt io n  2 .2
It is assumed that all IRS-sector firms are agglomerated in Foreign - making 
Foreign the industrial core of the economy - and that Home is peripheral and 
has to import all the IRS-sector goods.
3.1 The case of symmetric government activity
In this subsection we want to assume that both regions’ governments follow 
symmetric policies.
D efinition  2.1
‘Symmetric’ government activity is given when both governments set the same 
tax rate and face the same transformation function, i.e. tH = tF = t and gH(t) = 
gF(t) = g(t).
Note that we have now replaced the asterisk to denote the ‘other region’ with 
the more precise notation of subscripts, where subscript H denotes the Home region 
and subscript F denotes the Foreign region. The model outlined in section 2 can be 
simplified in several important ways. First, let us rewrite (2.11), this time using the 
new notation:
£*=(1 " 7 ) 0  "O+M'Wrt*. (2.11’)
where k = H, F. From Assumption 2.2 it follows that Foreign alone meets the demand 
for IRS-sector goods from both regions. In equilibrium it must also be true that total
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demand from Home and Foreign for a single variety of the manufactured good must 
equal the unit produced in Foreign:
1 =p ; ° [ e pP {f °~1) T(|-0)). (2.15)
Given (2 .1 1 ’) and (2 .15) we can now determine whether full agglomeration of 
IRS-sector firms in Foreign - as assumed in Assumption 2.2  - can be a stable 
equilibrium. Full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium, if no individual firm could 
move to Home, set up production there and break even. Given that the intermediate 
input factor I has to be imported from Foreign, profitability crucially depends on the 
gross wage coH paid to modified labour M37:
PROPOSITION 2.1 The maximum gross wage (dH a deviant firm  can offer to its 
workers without making losses in the face o f symmetric government activity in 
Home and in Foreign depends on t, g(t), T, p and a  is given by38:
(2.16)
2 x|,o(g (0 )°<1‘l‘)
Proof. See Appendix 2A. □
37 We rule out the option of private provision of the public good. It could be argued that a deviant firm 
might not have to rely on government policy at all as it could provide its own public good such as 
vocational training and health services for its labour force. Obviously these supporting activities would 
require additional labour input into the production process. It follows from that observation that such 
a firm would be at a cost disadvantage compared to the firms in Foreign, making it less likely to break­
even. For a study of private provision of public goods see Bliss and Nalebuff (1984).
However, we follow Martin and Rogers (1995b) and others that only the government can provide public 
infrastructure.
38 The reader should recognise the similarity of expression (2.16) to expression (17) in Krugman and 
Venables (1996). The difference is that this time the gross wage coH varies with g(t).
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Expression (2.16) merely extends the familiar criterion for agglomeration (see 
Krugman and Venables, 1996) to include symmetric government activity. In order to 
attract labour, the individual firm must offer a wage of at least cOh = (g(t))‘ *. Home 
therefore succeeds in attracting firms if and only if:
(1 + n ) T (1~°) + ( l  ~ n ) T (° ' 1> (2>17)
2 t m°
So for the case of symmetric government policies, the results derived by 
Krugman and Venables (1996a) carry directly over. This suggests that these 
government policies do not affect firm s’ location decisions and merely provide a 
‘level-playing field’ for the firms. The market forces which are generally discussed 
in the ‘new economic geography’ literature remain active and unchanged: p reflects 
the importance of forward and backward linkages (i.e. the market access and cost 
effects of clustering in one region) and therefore represents the external economies at 
work in the industrialised region. It can also be shown that for higher values of p and 
lower values of o, everything else being the same, Home is less able to attract 
industry into its region39. The transportation cost T also plays a crucial part: the lower 
t ,  which reflects a higher degree of economic integration between the two regions, 
the more difficult it is for Home to attract firms to its region. Firms are more likely 
to remain in Foreign to enjoy all the benefits of economic agglomeration and supply 
Home with exports40.
39 These results can be derived analytically: see Krugman (1991).
40 This result is in line with all the models in the ‘new economic geography’ literature. For a more 
detailed discussion on the underlying economic intuition behind this result therefore see, for example, 
Krugman (1991) or Venables (1996) and page 43 of this thesis.
46
3.2 The case of asymm etric government activity
Consider now the case in which governments follow different tax rates and/or 
have different levels of efficiency in providing the public good. This allows us to 
analyse whether different government activity generates new locational forces besides 
the existing market forces which might affect the location decision of firms.
D efin itio n  2 .2
‘Asymmetric’ government activity is given if Home and Foreign set either 
different tax rates and/or face different transformation functions, i.e tH ^  tF 
and/or gH(t) * gF(t).
Following the procedure outlined in section 3.1 , we can derive Proposition 1.1* 
for the case of asymmetric government activity:
PROPOSITION 1.1’ The maximum gross wage <% a deviant firm  can offer to its 
workers without making losses in the face o f asymmetric government activities 
depends on tH, tF, t ,  g(tF), p and a  is given by:
cdg(1"m) =03/7 (2.16’) 
[(1 - p ) ( l  - r F) +p ( 2 - r / /- r F) ] ^ 1-°) +[( l - M) ( l  - t H) ] f ° ~ l)
Proof See Appendix 2B. □
Horne therefore succeeds in attracting firms if and only if:
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[(1 - | i ) (  1 - tF) +M( 2 ~tH- t F) ] ^ - a) +[(1 -M)( 1 - ^ ) ] ^ (0' 1) ^
( 2 - t H- t F)T"° (2.17’)
(  Vd-M)
g(*F)
We can distinguish three cases: the first two obtain analytical results, whereas 
the third one relies on simulations to give us some insights. The economic intuition 
for all three cases is given below.
i) For x = 1, (2.17’) simplifies to:
i.e. in the case of complete integration, both regions offer the same market access and 
the same price index for the intermediate input factor I, leaving the price of the 
modified labour M as the only factor influencing a Firm’s location decision. Home
to succeed in attracting firms. Note that Home would attract all firms for g(tH) > g(tF).
At this stage it is convenient to introduce a specific functional form for g(t) 
which meets the criteria set out in Assumption 2.1. Let us assume that gk(tk) = T|k tke, 
with e > 0 and rj < 1. £ is the elasticity of the public good provision with respect to 
changes in the tax rate tk. r\ represents the fact that the transformation potentially 
involves some loss in labour and thus reflects the efficiency with which the public 
sector can transform L into M. (2.18) can then be rewritten as:
(2.18)
therefore needs to provide at least the same level of public good as Foreign if it wants
V £ , (2.18’)
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that is, with identical values of r|, Home has to at least match Foreign’s tax rate if it 
wants to succeed in attracting firms. However, when Home is more efficient than 
Foreign in providing the public good (r|H > t)f), then a lower tax rate in Home would 
suffice to attract firms.
ii) For tH = tF = t with rjH *  r |F, (2.17’) can be rewritten as:
which collapses into (2.17) for r\H = rjF. This result implies that a more efficient Home 
government (relatively to the Foreign) is more likely to attract firms than a less 
efficient one. Figures 2.1a/b/c represent the cases in which Home is less/equally/more 
efficient in providing the local public good than Foreign41:
(  Vu-m)
( l + p ) T (,-°) + ( l - p ) T (° - 1)>
2 t^
^F (2.19)
Home less efficient than Foreign (nH = 0.65) 
Figure 2.1a
41 The parameter values chosen for all these diagrams, unless otherwise stated, are a  = 4, p = 0.45, 8 = 
0.5 and tjh = rjF = 0.75. Note that Krugman and Venables (1996a) set p = 0.5.
2.4
2.2
Home as efficient as Foreign 
Figure 2.1b
&
2.2
Home more efficient than Foreign (nH = 0.85)
Figure 2.1c
Home is able to attract firms to its region as long as coH is above the minimum 
necessary level of cocrit. It can be seen that this varies with the different levels of 
government efficiency. The level of transportation cost above which this is the case 
is denoted by T* in the figures. Also note that Figure 2.1b is identical to the case 
derived in Krugman and Venables (1996a) and given by (2.16).
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iii) For all the other cases, it is best to rely on simulations to gain some economic 
insight.
A s s u m p t i o n  2.3
Foreign’s industrial policy is exogenous to the model, i.e. changes in Home’s 
policy do not affect Foreign government’s choice of tF.
A more realistic setup would take into account that Foreign’s policy is affected 
by Home’s policy and vice versa. Given that we have not stated specific objective 
functions for the two governments, we cannot specify a unique best response function 
for either government. Instead we can describe a range of policy combinations which 
could be used by the government to achieve its objectives. In the following section, 
we hold Foreign’s tax rate constant at tF= 0.5 and analyse the Home government’s 
range of policies, while the implications of relaxing assumption 2.3 are discussed in 
section 4.2 of this chapter. Figure 2.2 shows the Home government’s ability to attract 
firms to its region as a function of tH and t :
r 5 
A 
3 
2
0 0.2 0.A 0.6 0.8 1 H
Different tax rates but equal efficiency levels 
Figure 2.2
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In Figure 2.2  the transportation cost T is shown along the vertical axis, whereas 
the Home government’s policy variable tH is represented along the horizontal axis. The 
shaded areas reflect all combinations of T and tH which would enable Home to attract 
firms - the case when (2 .1 7 ’) is satisfied. One of the shaded areas can be found at T 
close to 1 and tH > tF - illustrating the result given by expression (2 .18). More 
interesting though is the interpretation of the location and expansion of the shaded 
area for higher transportation cost.
PROPOSITION 2 .2  Asymmetric government policies give rise to two new, 
opposing agglomeration forces:
on the one hand, an increase o f tax rate tH leads to lower disposable income 
and therefore to lower final consumer demand (final consumer demand effect) 
in Home. Everything else being equal, a deviant firm  would be confronted with 
lower consumer demand and would thus be less able to break even in Home. 
Home would be a less attractive location fo r  industrial production.
On the other hand, a higher tax rate reduces the price o f the input factor M  
(input price effect) and would make it easier, everything else being equal, fo r  
a deviant firm  to break even42. This would make Home a more attractive 
location fo r  industrial production43.
PROPOSITION 2.3 A change in the Home government’s efficiency level (as given 
by a change in r\H) leads to a change in the relative strength o f  the two 
forces: holding the tax rate constant, the final consumer demand effect would 
remain unaffected. However, a change in the efficiency level would affect the 
input price effect.
42 So for the case of equal tax rates across the two regions, the two forces would be of equal strength in 
the two regions and would thus not affect the relative size of demand and the price index between the 
regions.
43 These two forces thus affect the two main location factors of companies: proximity to markets and the 
cost of labour (Commission of the European Communities, 1993, p. 77).
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3.2.1 Comparative statics
In this subsection we do comparative statics to verify Proposition 2.3. We then 
analyse the effects of parameter changes on the expansion of the shaded area which 
can tell us in which way Home’s ability to attract firms is affected by different 
degrees of agglomeration forces. We confirm the familiar results of the ‘new economic 
geography’ literature that higher degrees of agglomeration forces (as given by stronger 
vertical linkages and/or a higher preference for variety) are more likely to support full 
agglomeration of IRS-sector firms in one region as an equilibrium.
In the case of an efficiency gain (an increase in r\H), the wage to be paid to 
one unit of M would fall and hence the input price effect would become stronger. 
Home would thus become a more attractive location for production and a deviant firm 
is then more likely to break even44. Home’s increased attractiveness as a production 
location is reflected by an increase in the-size of the shaded area. This is shown in 
Figure 2.3:
44 This effect confirms previous results: ‘[A]n improvement in (...) infrastructure in the home country will 
imply a relocation of firms to this country...’ if the productivity of government expenditures is high’ 
(Martin and Rogers, 1995b, p. 345).
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Different tax rates and efficiency levels: rjH > rjF 
Figure 2.3
The parameter values chosen for Figure 2.3 are the same as for Figure 2.2, 
except that r |H = 0.85. The efficiency level of public good provision and the 
agglomeration forces determine the expansion of the shaded area in the horizontal 
plane. For a given value of r |H, the agglomeration forces vary with x: as x falls, the 
agglomeration forces become stronger as the Home region’s market can now be more 
easily accessed by Foreign firms. Consequently, firms would like to remain in the 
industry cluster to take full advantage of the existing linkages. This observation is in 
line with the results generally obtained in the ‘new economic geography’ literature 
(see footnote (40)). It can also be seen that the range of ‘successful’ (in attracting 
firms) policies decreases with the degree of economic integration. The lower the 
degree of economic integration, the more attractive is the Home market for the deviant 
firm. In that case, a firm might want to move even though the Home government’s 
policy might not be ‘carefully’ chosen. With a higher degree of economic integration 
though, a deviant firm is less attracted to the Home market and hence the Home 
government has to be more ‘careful’ in setting its policies. Home and Foreign are in 
stronger competition with each other for firms which are more sensitive to variations 
in market size and input prices.
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Turning to the familiar agglomeration forces as discussed in the ‘new economic 
geography’ literature themselves, we find that the stronger they are, the more difficult 
it is for the Home government to attract firms. One factor determining the magnitude 
of the agglomeration forces is the degree of vertical linkages: a higher value of p 
represents stronger vertical linkages. From (2.3) and (2.5) it follows that IRS-sector 
firms’ benefit of locating close to the manufacturing cluster is increased. As a 
consequence, Home faces more difficulties attracting firms. Figure 2.4 represents this 
situation:
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Stronger vertical linkages than in Figure 2.2 
Figure 2.4
The parameter values for Figure 2.4 are identical to those chosen for Figure
2.2 except for p = 0.49. The second factor determining the magnitude of 
agglomeration forces is the degree of imperfect competition in the IRS-sector. The 
higher this degree - as represented in a lower value of a  - the stronger the incentive 
to exploit economies of scale and to stay in Foreign. This is shown in Figure 2.5:
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Figure 2.5
This time the only change in parameter values, compared to Figure 2.2, has 
been to set G = 3. Once again, this result is in line with previous results derived in the 
‘new economic geography’ literature (see, for example, Krugman and Venables, 1996).
4. E xtensions
4.1 Transfer payments from Foreign to Home
The analysis so far has been based on the assumption that each region’s 
government has to raise its own tax revenues to finance its local public good 
provision. However, it is reasonable to assume that Foreign offers transfer payments 
to Home in order to accelerate Home’s development and, ultimately, to achieve 
convergence of the two regions. This would be the case as experienced in Europe - 
as discussed in the introduction to this thesis.
Here we briefly outline what we expect for such a setup: we should find that 
the mechanisms at work are still the same, in other words we still have the two new 
forces. During the transition period towards convergence, Foreign has to finance the
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public good provision in both Foreign and Home. Let us assume the extreme case in 
which Home’s citizens do not contribute at all. Disposable income and hence total 
final consumer demand in Foreign is therefore:
where tF is used to finance Foreign projects and tR is the transfer payment to Home 
to finance Home projects. The implications of these transfer payments are as follows: 
on the one hand, Foreign’s final consumer demand is reduced twice - making Foreign 
a less attractive production location. On the other hand, Home is becoming 
unambiguously more attractive as a production location: its public good provision is 
improved without the previously attached cost of a smaller final consumer market. 
Depending on the size of the transfer chosen, we can show that Home is able to attract 
firms for any level of transportation cost T. This is shown in Figure 2.6:
For Figure 2.6 we have set Foreign’s tax rate tF = 0.25. Along the horizontal 
line we have the level of transfer payments from Foreign to Home. Given that tF =
0.25, the transfer cannot exceed 0.75 - thus the area to the right of the vertical line
(2.20)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 R
Transfer payments from Foreign to Home 
Figure 2.6
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at 0.75 should be ignored for the interpretation45. It can be seen that transfer payments 
have to rise for lower transportation costs to overcome the stronger agglomeration 
tendency46. Notice that a policy mix which promotes a reduction of transportation cost 
in addition to transfer payments from Foreign to Home simultaneously (the case of the 
European Union again) is partly self-defeating: the former makes convergence more 
difficult to achieve (as long as transportation cost remain positive), the latter makes 
it easier to achieve47.
4.2 The Nash equilibrium in tax rates
Throughout this chapter we have assumed that the Foreign government held 
its tax rate (and hence the level of public good provision in Foreign) constant, while 
Home could choose any value of t. The implications of relaxing this assumption can 
best be illustrated by analysing the case of t = 1. On page 48 we argued that in the 
case of complete economic integration, a firm’s location decision only depends on the 
cost of the regionally provided modified labour M. Given this and the nature of the 
governments’ objective functions (which do not consider utility), each government has 
an incentive to provide a higher level of public good provision than the other region’s 
government. Assuming that both governments have the same level of efficiency, both 
governments would set t = 1 in the Nash equilibrium in tax rates and would provide
45 See Appendix 2C for an outline of the underlying structure for Figure 2.6.
46 Figure 2.6 has been generated in the same way as the previous figures. Analytically it also follow s-------
closely Appendices A and B, taking into account that Home doesn’t have to raise any tax revenues 
whereas Foreign has to raise tax revenues for itself and for the transfer payments.
47 This observation is confirmed by Fujita and Mori: ‘[0]ur study indicates that given an economy having 
a core-periphery dualism, in order to promote the industrial growth in the periphery, it is not always 
helpful to improve the transport connections between the two regions... If the periphery region does not 
possess a comparative advantage in any industry, then such a transport improvement will simply help 
to intensify the market competition for industrial products in the periphery... In such a situation, a 
temporary protection of industries in the periphery by worsening the transport connection ... may result 
in a more desirable result!’ (Fujita and Mori, 1996, p. 97).
See also Martin and Rogers (1995b) who analyse the effects of improving transportation networks 
between an industrialised core and a less-developed periphery on the location decision of firms.
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the same amount of public goods. Firms would then be evenly distributed across the 
two regions. For values other than x = 1, market access and intermediate input prices 
would again become factors influencing a firm’s location decision. The Nash 
equilibrium in tax rates would then crucially depend on the importance of forward and 
backward linkages, as given by p.
4.3 The simultaneous move of several firms
In this chapter we stated or illustrated the condition necessary for one Foreign 
firm to relocate to Home. We argued that once this single firm had moved, more firms 
would follow as the forward and backward linkages (i.e. the market access and cost 
effects of clustering) would start to work in Home. Our analysis focused on the 
policies necessary to attract this one crucial firm and also showed under which 
conditions the Home government would fail to attract it. Now consider the case in 
which the Home government could encourage several firms to move simultaneously, 
maybe by coordinating their location decisions. In the context of our model we expect 
such a policy to increase the Home government’s "success rate" of attracting industry. 
This is because firms within such a group would benefit from the group’s backward 
and forward linkages, making the other location factors, such as market access or the 
local price of M, relatively less important. This implies that a group of firms would 
still move at a level of transportation cost too high for a single firm to move. It also 
means that the Home government, ceteris paribus, could provide a smaller amount of 
public good and still attract the group of firms.
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5. Concluding remarks
Regional economic policies are generally seen as major factors determining the 
geographical distribution of economic activity and most countries have therefore 
witnessed public discussions on this issue. A strong industrial base is still viewed by 
many to be essential to support a high standard of living and politicians should 
therefore follow policies which increase the attractiveness of a region as an industrial 
location. However, there is a debate on what constitutes the ‘best’ regional economic 
policy: should a government follow a ‘small government’ or a ‘large government’ 
policy in order to attract industry?
This chapter addressed the above question from the point of view of an under­
developed region’s government which raises domestic tax revenues to finance the 
provision of local public goods. The chapter shed some light on this issue, arguing 
that such a regional government has to be aware of the fact that its policies create new 
forces of economic agglomeration and dispersion: on the one hand, raising tax 
revenues inevitably reduces the local market size, on the other hand, providing local 
productive goods improves the attractiveness of the location. The former effect makes 
the region in question less attractive as an industrial location, whereas the latter effect 
improves the region’s attractiveness. It was argued that the magnitude of these forces 
(and hence the ability to attract firms) depends crucially on the public sector’s 
efficiency level. A regional government should therefore focus less on the debate 
‘small public sector versus large public sector’ but instead should try to increase its 
efficiency level. This is the potentially most successful way of attracting firms to its 
region.
However regional economic policies are not the only factors which determine 
the location of industries. This chapter demonstrated that a ‘sensible’ economic policy 
is necessary but not sufficient to successfully attract firms into a region. This implies 
that even the most ‘attractive’ policy can fail as long as the underlying economic
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forces of industrial agglomeration are too strong. It was shown that this is most likely 
to happen with either low transportation costs between the regions or strong linkages 
between the industries. In these cases firms would not break away from their industrial 
cluster in the more developed region. This shows that politicians cannot always be 
blamed for failed policies.
In the final section we confirmed results obtained recently by Fujita and Mori 
(1996). It was shown that transfer payments from a highly industrialised to a less 
industrialised region can always overcome the uneven distribution of firms. However, 
transfer payments are generally complemented by infrastructure projects between the 
regions - a policy which works in the opposite direction of the transfer payments.
Future extensions to this model could include the modelling of different tax 
bases. Especially interesting would be to analyse the effects of introducing a tax on 
firms’ profits. By doing so we could provide some arguments to the generally held 
discussion on corporate taxation and mobile firms. For example, we could study under 
which conditions high tax rates on corporate profits could induce firms to relocate to 
another region. An answer to this question is, however, outside the scope of this 
chapter.
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Appendix 2A
Proof o f Proposition 2.1:
This section derives the maximum gross wage which a deviant firm moving 
from the industrialised Foreign region to the trailing Home region can offer to 
manufacturing workers without suffering losses. It is assumed that initially all of 
manufacturing takes place in Foreign and that both governments impose the same tax 
rate and have the same efficiency levels.
Define E as the ratio of total expenditure on the x good of the Home region 
to that of the Foreign region. Using (2.4), (2.8), (2.10) and the facts that CO = (g (t))'1 
and x = 1 in (2.11’), we get:
e  ( 1 ' r ) ( 1  ' , ) + 7 r ^ ^ «
E = Z 1 = ____________________________________(A2.1)
Ef  ( l - Y ) ( l - f ) + __ !i—  Lyf
With no production of the x-good taking place in Home, total income of 
manufacturing workers in the Foreign region is a share (1-p) of the total expenditure 
on the x-good by firms in Foreign and citizens in both regions:
LyF=( 1 - F ) 2(1 ~ y ) ( i  - t )  +
( l - F )
XF (A2.2)
which simplifies to:
Lx = 2 ( l - y ) ( l - r ) (A2.3)
Noting that LXH= 0 and substituting (A2.3) in (A2.1) yields:
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j  = i 1  i P .. (A2.4)
( 1+H)
A firm only considers moving to the Home region if it is able to break even 
there. Hence the zero profit condition (2.12) must be satisfied in both regions:
where px = piXH / piXF and P = PH / PF. Using the ratio of expression (2.8) in 
combination with (2.3) and 0)F = (g(t))'1 gives:
p v =/5i,<41' |,>( £ ( 0 ) (1",,). (A2-6)
Rearranging (A2.5), substituting in (A2.6) and also P = T, we can derive:
(1  + £ ) = ( x ' ,oi'"',>( g ( 0 ) <1"'')) '<’( £ t (', - | ) +T(1-<,)) .  (A 2 -7)
Substituting (A2.4) into (A2.7) and solving for coHCT (1 ' then proves 
Proposition 2.1.
Appendix 2B
Proof o f  Proposition 2.1
This section follows the previous section closely, except that it allows for 
different tax rates and efficiency levels across the regions. Define E as the ratio of 
total expenditure on the x good of the Home region to that of the Foreign region. By 
(2.11’):
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n(1 - y ) (  l - t H) +—J -
e = — =_________LL
E
F)
X H
'  ( l - y ) ( l - f F) +TJ ! _ L XF
( 1 - B)
With no production of the x-good taking place in Home, total income of 
manufacturing workers in the Foreign region is a share (1-p) of the total expenditure 
on the x-good by firms in Foreign and citizens in both regions:
(1 - y )(1 - t F) +(1 - y  )(1 ~tH)
(1-F)
(B2.2)
so that:
lxf=( i (B2.3)
With Lxh= 0 and substituting (B2.3) in (B2.1) yields:
(1 <w) (62.4)
(1 - m)(1
A firm only considers moving to Home if it is able to break even there. Hence 
the zero profit condition (2.12) must be satisfied in both regions:
where px = piXH / piXF and P = PH /  PF. As in proof to Proposition 2.1, it can be 
shown that:
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pJ = P H l'')(g ((f ))» -'>. (B2.6)
Solving for coH° (1' then follows exactly the same procedure as described in 
Appendix 2A.
Appendix 2C
Once again we follow Appendix 2A closely. This time note that the ratio E for 
the x-good is:
£ = . ( 1 - Y )  (C2.1)
( l - Y) ( W f - g +_ ^ _ L XF
where LXF = (1 - y) (2 - tF - tR). We can then rewrite (C2.1) as:
(C2.2)
£  =_ (1-M)
This can then be substituted into (A2.5) to derive Figure 2.6’s underlying 
structure.
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Chapter 3
Provision of productive local public 
goods and intra-industry trade
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1. Introduction
Local public economics has been studying the tax raising and public good 
provision behaviour of regional governments for a long time and several strands of the 
literature have developed: one branch of local public economics is the fiscal (tax) 
competition literature which has addressed these issues in the context of open 
economies such as cities, states or countries. The focus of attention has been on 
optimal tax rates and the efficient level of public goods provision. Most fiscal 
competition models have addressed this topic by making a few standard key 
assumptions on the form of the local public good provided, the mobility of the tax 
base and the type of competition between firms residing in the regions.
It has, for example, been generally assumed that the local public good (LPG) 
enters the utility function of consumers and does not enter the production process of 
firms (Wildasin, 1987). However, many examples can be given to support the latter 
case, e.g. education, vocational training or the provision of a legal framework48 are all 
necessary for production to take place in the location and recent research has 
addressed this issue (see for instance Deo and Duran ton, 1995)49. Commuting 
infrastructure is another LPG which is necessary for production. The British 
government, for example, recognises this, stating that transport is an important part 
of the cost structure of almost every business and of the UK economy as a whole 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1994). And even though the existence of such 
infrastructure is generally taken for granted, it only needs one general strike to remind 
the public of its crucial importance in the production process of industry.
48 Note that the examples given are not necessarily pure public goods. However, for the following analysis 
it is assumed that these goods are supplied in a non-exclusionary and non-rival way, e.g. education 
could be done via the television (The Learning Zone on BBC).
49 See page 19 of the introduction on public intermediate goods.
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Another key assumption generally made is factor mobility between regions 
(Wildasin and Wilson, 1991). This has been done in the light of a more integrated 
world in which factors of production such as capital or labour have become 
increasingly more mobile. Most models also assume that regional governments levy 
a tax on these mobile factors, especially capital, even though this distorts investment 
location decisions. Models of this type generate one of the key results of the fiscal 
competition literature, namely the ‘inefficiency in regional tax policies.’ To quote 
Bucovetsky and Wilson: ‘[T]he explanation given for inefficiently low tax rates in the 
tax competition literature is that each government treats as a cost the capital outflow 
that occurs when it taxes capital to finance additional public good provision, whereas 
the outflow is not a cost from the viewpoint of the entire economy, since other regions 
benefit from the resulting capital outflows’ (Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991, p. 342).
This result does not hold, however, when the tax is levied on regionally 
immobile factors and it has therefore been argued that ‘...[o]ther forms of taxation are 
clearly preferable ... In particular, taxes on labor income ... are nondistortionary’ as 
‘[t]he assumed fixity of each region’s labor supply insures that ... a wage income is 
lump-sum. Wilson (1986) observes that the introduction of lump-sum taxes restores 
efficiency in regional government behaviour.’ (Bucovetsky-and Wilson, 1991, p.333).
Another branch of the literature-is.- represented by, for example, Scotchmer 
(1986). She studies the effects of imperfectly competitive jurisdictions on the amount 
of LPGs provision when consumers are mobile and the objective of the regional 
government is to maximise the land value within its jurisdiction (i.e. the LPGs are 
provided-to enrich landowners). She provides the following intuition why local public 
goods are underprovided in her model: ‘[I]n equilibrium, the marginal unit of LPG 
causes the rental value of land to rise by exactly the cost of the LPG. Since the cost 
of LPGs gets taxed away from landowners the net increment to land value is zero. 
Suppose now that the marginal unit of LPG in jurisdiction j caused land prices 
elsewhere to fall as emigration occurred ... Since other jurisdictions are then more
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attractive ..., the fall in prices elsewhere dampens the increase in demand for land in 
jurisdiction j ... Thus the response on rental price ... is dampened also. This makes 
LPGs less lucrative to landowners, and hence LPGs may be underprovided’. It is this 
‘... [pjecuniary externality of one jurisdiction’s policy on prices elsewhere ...’ which 
matters (Scotchmer, 1986, pp. 465-466).
So far, most of the models within this literature have only studied the 
implications of factor mobility on the tax raising behaviour of local governments50. 
However, closer economic integration between regions has not only fostered factor 
mobility between regions but also increased product mobility (Emerson, 1988), 
especially in intra-industry goods: ‘The European Commission (1990a, p. 142) 
...argue(d) that the (European) Community is increasingly characterised by intra­
industry trade based on the exploitation of economies of scale, rather than inter­
industry trade based on the specialisation through comparative advantage. They 
calculate that in 1987, between 57 per cent and 83 per cent of trade between the EC 
countries was intra-industry (European Commission, 1990b, p.41)...’ (Bean, 1992, p. 
7).
The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to analyse the implications of 
product mobility on regional government behaviour with respect to tax raising and 
local public good provision, especially when these local public goods are productive 
in nature. The questions raised here are similar to Gordon’s: ‘...[ajssuming that each 
unit of government does in fact act in the best interests of its own citizens, will the 
collection of units of governments together act in the best interests of all their citizens. 
Stated differently, what types of problems can arise from decentralised decision­
making?’ (Gordon, 1983, p. 567).
50 For an exception, see Wildasin (1993) who analyses the consequences of inter-industry trade between 
one upstream supplier located in one region and a downstream industry located in the other region on 
tax setting policies by regional governments.
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In order to address this issue, this chapter merges aspects of public economics 
and international trade theory. To do so, it is convenient to build on the framework 
of Chapter 2 of this thesis and to use techniques developed in the ‘new international 
trade literature’ such as in Krugman (1979, 1980), and especially Venables (1987). In 
contrast to the models used in the fiscal competition literature, these models assume 
monopolistically-competitive firms which can give rise to intra-industry trade as 
observed in the real world.
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section formalises the general 
setup of the model and analyses the optimal government policy under autarky. This 
is used as a reference for later comparison. Section 3 extends the model to two regions 
so that we can analyse the issue of optimal taxation in a fiscal federation. The Nash 
equilibrium in tax rates for the symmetric two region case is derived. Section 4 shows 
that by delegating the tax-raising power to an economy-wide central planner, both 
regions could raise their utility levels. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Home region under autarky
For simplicity and to have a reference for later purposes, we start by analysing 
the optimal government tax policy in a single region which is necessary to maximise 
the utility of its citizens. The region consists of many identical citizens so that the 
central planner - here the regional government - can rely on an individual’s welfare 
implications when comparing different policies. Note that the basic structure is closely 
related to that of Chapter 2 - the main difference being the absence of vertical 
linkages in the economy. Citizens provide the only factor of production - labour L, 
which we normalise to unity. Identity of all citizens also implies identical endowments 
of one unit of labour and identical consumption preferences. Workers can either be 
employed in the public sector - which is discussed in section 2.2 - or in the private 
sector, in which case they are either employed in a constant returns to scale (CRS) 
industry or in an industry subject to increasing returns (IRS). The industry producing
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under constant returns to scale manufactures a good which we label "y", whereas the 
industry producing under increasing returns manufactures a range of products of the 
"x"-type. The labour force is split into these three activities so that:
where Lg is the fraction of workers in the public sector, Lx is the fraction of workers 
in the IRS-sector and Ly is the fraction of workers in the CRS-sector.
2.1 Private demand and utility
A representative consumer receives income only from work and spends it on 
an aggregate X of the "x" good and "y" goods with Cobb-Douglas preferences. The 
indirect utility V of such a consumer depends on the net wage and is given by:
where ws is the nominal wage in the sectors with s = x, y, g, P is the price index for 
the aggregate X of a potentially large number of manufactured goods and py is the 
price of the CRS good. We also have 0 < y < 1. The above exponents imply that the 
consumer spends the fraction (1 - y) of his disposable income on the IRS-sector’s 
differentiated products and the fraction y on the CRS-sector good. Let us choose the 
CRS-sector good as the numeraire so that py = 1. Furthermore, choosing the units of 
the CRS good in such a way that one unit of output requires exactly one unit of labour 
input, we also have wy = 1. t is the tax rate imposed by the government on labour 
income with 0 < t < 1 so that disposable income is given by ws (1 - t). As in Dixit
(3.1)
V =
S
ws( l - t )
P {l' y)Py
(3.2)
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and Stiglitz (1977), the price index P of the aggregate X of manufactured goods is 
given by51:
/
P = E  p Hi = 1
d - o )  
V ' J
\  1
( i  -o ) (3.3)
where n is the number of firms producing in the region52 and pxi is the price charged 
by a single firm i. a  - which is larger than one - is the elasticity of substitution 
between the varieties and thus reflects the degree of economies of scale which could 
be exploited by a firm. It can be shown that in equilibrium53, all n varieties are sold 
at the same price and therefore:
52
‘ (3.4)/>=nTTT37
2.2 The public sector
Following Chapter 2 of this thesis, we assume that the regional government 
always balances its budget and spends all of its tax revenues on hiring citizens. These 
citizens are employed to provide some form of public good. In order to employ a 
citizen in the public sector, the government has to offer the same wage as the 
industries in the private sector, i.e. wg = wy = 1. Crucially let us assume that the
The dual to this price index is given by:
x=
( \  °
» i i l l l  WTJ
E * i
v'=1 /
o
It is shown later that each firm produces exactly one variety and hence the number of firms reflects the 
number of varieties produced.
See Krugman (1980) for that.
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public good is productive in nature and is required by the firms in the IRS-industry 
to transform "raw" labour L into the necessary intermediate input factor M (M for 
modified). This transformation can be in the form of publicly-funded and provided 
vocational training or education, communication networks or public health service for 
the workforce etc54. How much of a given amount of labour is transformed into the 
input factor M depends on the level of public good provision g(T), where T is the tax 
revenue raised. Note that T = t w L = t and hence g(T) = g(t)55. Assumption 3.1 is 
motivated in the same way as Assumption 2.1 in Chapter 2. The reader is refered to 
page 39 of this thesis for a discussion of Assumption 3.1.
A ssu m p t io n  3.1
The total amount of M available to the IRS-sector depends on g(t) and the 
initial amount Lx of "raw" labour to be transformed:
where M is homogenous of degree one with respect to Lx.
2.3 The IRS-sector
Let us now turn to the structure of the IRS-sector. Firms in this sector produce 
a potentially large number of differentiated products of type x and require the
54 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 2, section 2.2. Note that we once again rule out any kind 
of congestion cost.
55 We once again rule out private provision of the public good. Hence a firm could not transform labour 
L into M for itself. For a longer discussion on that issue, also see footnote 37 of this thesis.
(a)
(b)
(c)
g(0) = 0 
g’(t) > 0
g(t) < 1 V t e t O ; ! ] .
M  = G{t, Lx) = g(t) Lx , (3.5)
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intermediate input factor M for production. The production of an individual good x 
by firm i involves a fixed cost a  and a constant marginal cost (3:
m . = a + p x . , (3.6)
where nij is the amount of M required by a single firm to produce its output Xj. An 
IRS-sector firm has to pay a wage CD = (g(t))‘ 1 to one unit of M. The total cost c of 
producing x units of output for an individual firm is:
c.= © ( a + p j t . ) .  (3.7)
We see from equations (3.5) and (3.7), everything else being equal, that a
higher level of public good provision would reduce the total cost of production for an
individual firm. Each individual firm maximises its profit against the demand function 
as given by footnote (51). It can be shown that in equilibrium firms are identical and 
set the following mark-up over marginal cost to maximises profits:
p  - p  .= ___^ _____ 1 (3 . (3.8)
Px Pxi ( G - i )  g a y
Free entry into and exit out of this industry ensure that profits are driven down 
to zero. With zero profits in equilibrium, the output level can be derived to be equal 
for every firm and is given by:
x  =x. =— ( g  - 1 ) .  (3.9)
' p
In order to save notation, by choice of units, let a  = 1 /  a  and p = ( G - 1 ) 
/ a , so that x = 1 and px = CD. A higher level of public good provision thus leads to 
lower marginal production cost and hence to a lower price charged by an individual
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firm. From (3.4) it follows that the price level P falls as px drops. Using the above 
notation, it follows directly from x = 1 and (3.6) that each individual firm demands 
m = 1 units of intermediate input. The number of firms n is therefore given by:
n =M =g(t)Lx. (3.10)
Lx can be found by noting that the total income of workers in the IRS-sector 
must equal the total expenditure E on the aggregate of x goods in the economy. Total 
expenditure E, however, equals the fraction (1 - y) of disposable income in the 
economy (see (3.2)). Hence:
(3.11a)
We also know that the number of workers in the public sector is Lg = t. The 
number of workers in the CRS-sector can be determined by the adding-up constraint 
of equation (3.1) in the labour market:
Ly = l - t - L x= y ( l  - t ) . (3.11b)
It is thus that a fraction (1 - y) of the-private sector’s labour force works in 
the IRS-sector, whereas the fraction y works in the CRS-sector. This reflects the 
consumer preferences as given in equation (3.2). ------
2.4 The optimal tax rate t* in the autarky case
It is straightforward to determine the utility maximising tax rate in the region: 
the regional government chooses t, taking into account t’s effects on disposable 
income and on the price index. The latter effect can be found from (3.4), (3.5), (3.8), 
(3.10) and (3.11a).
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PROPOSITION 3.1 The utility maximising tax rate t* depends on the underlying 
parameters y and a  o f the region and the transformation function g(t) and is 
given by:
(3.12)
Proof See Appendix 3A. □
For the sake of concreteness, let us here introduce the same functional form 
as in Chapter 2 so that g(t) = r| tE, with e > 0 and rj < 1. e is the elasticity of the 
public good provision with respect to changes in the tax rate t. r\ is a scale factor 
which reflects the "internal" efficiency of the regional government and it is assumed 
that the transformation always involves some loss. In that case we can rewrite (3.12) 
as:
, *=  e O - Y )
1 ------------- y -----  (3.12’)
e ( l  - y ) - 2 -  + 1 
a
In the following we interpret t* for the extreme values of the parameters:
i) For a  —» «>, the IRS-sector becomes perfectly competitive. Equation (3.12’) then 
simplifies to t* = £ ( 1 - y ) / ( £ (  1 - y ) + 1 ). It can be shown that t* achieves 
product-mix efficiency, i.e. the economy produces on its production-possibility 
frontier, while at the same time maximising citizens’ utility. Following McMillan 
(1979) and Feehan (1989), the efficiency condition is given generally when X 
0 F i/3R)/(3Fi/3Vi) = 1 /0FR/3V;), where Fj is the production function of firm i, R is the 
public good, Vj is the amount of factor input required and FR is the production 
function of the public good. In our particular case, it can be shown that the left hand
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side is equal to Lx/g(t), whereas the right hand side equals l/g ’(t). Equating these two 
sides and solving for t yields the above expression for t*. We can also derive the 
effect of a change of <J on the optimal tax rate:
d t * _ e y ( y  ~ 1)
do
(3.13)
o
i.e. a higher degree of competition between firms in the IRS-sector (as reflected by 
an increase in a) leads to a fall in t*: tougher competition forces firms to lower their 
mark-up a  / (a  - 1) over marginal cost. A (slightly) higher marginal cost can thus be 
accepted, especially as this can be achieved with a lower tax rate.
ii) For y = 1, indirect utility as given by (3.2) simplifies to V = w (1 - t) py'Y. 
Setting t = 0 implies that no public good is provided and consequently no good of the 
"x" -type can be manufactured. The entire labour force is then employed in the CRS- 
industry^.so that total output is y = L =1. It can be shown that t = 0 achieves product- 
mix efficiency.
iii) For y = 0, citizens derive utility only from consuming the "x" -type good and 
therefore spent all their income on it. As in ii), product-mix efficiency is achieved 
when the economy produces on its production possibility frontier, while at the same 
time maximising citizens’ utility. Given that citizens do not wish to consume the "y" - 
type good, the entire labour force should be employed to produce the "x" -type good. 
It can be shown that t* = e /  ( e + l )  maximises the amount of M available for use 
in the IRS-industry, therefore achieving product-mix efficiency.
Both ii) and iii) can be derived by equating the marginal rate of substitution 
with the marginal rate of transformation. These can be found from the utility (3.2) and 
production functions.
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3. A two-region model with intra-industry trade
Having formalised the setup for a single region in the previous section and 
having established the optimum tax rate t* for such a case as a reference, we can now 
apply the framework to address the key issue of this paper: can product mobility in 
the form of intra-industry trade give cause to inefficiently low public good provision, 
even when the regional governments receive their tax revenues from an immobile 
factor? Taking the autarky case as the reference, what are the consequences of opening 
up the region to trade with another, identical region? Does the optimal tax policy lead 
to the same or to a different welfare level as under autarky?
In order to answer this question, let us assume the existence of two regions, 
Home and Foreign (denoted by H and F), which have identical endowments, 
technology and consumer preferences. Both economies also have their own 
representative governments which can set tax rates between 0 and 1. Transportation 
costs between the two regions play an important role in this setup: let us assume that 
the CRS-sector good can be costlessly transported from one region to the other, so that 
the price of it remains the same across the whole economy56. The x-good though is 
costly to ship from one region to the other. We follow the economic geography 
literature in assuming "Samuelson" type transportation costs T: of every unit of an x- 
good shipped, only a fraction 1 / % arrives in the other region - the rest melts away. 
Note that T > 1.
3.1 Utility in the two-region case
Consumers can purchase their goods from Home and Foreign suppliers. The 
price index as given by equation (3.3) must be modified to take into account the 
transportation costs and the potentially different industry sizes in the two regions. In
56 This again follows Krugman (1980).
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the following let us focus on the Home region, but note that similar expressions exist 
fo r  the Foreign region. The price index for Home is given by:
, (3-14)
where nH and nF are the number of IRS-sector firms in Home and Foreign 
respectively, while pH and pF are the prices charged by individual firms in Home and 
Foreign. The prices are given by expressions analogous to (3.8).
To find the welfare-maximising price index, we have to note that in the open 
economy case, total demand from Home and Foreign for a single variety produced in 
Home has to be equal to its supply. This condition is given by the following 
expression:
1 =p ; ° ( e hP ? ' [) +EFP l? ~ 'h l'-°)) . <3-15)
The expenditure on the IRS-sector Ej - with j = H, F - is given by the fraction 
(1 - y) of disposable income in the two regions:
Ej Hl - y W- t j ) .  (3-16)
Given that (3.15) represents total demand for the output of one firm in Home, 
the value of total sales SH of all varieties in Home is given by:
S h - W *  ~ ° \ E h P « ~ U + E fP ^ - ' \ " ^ )  . ( 3 - 1 7 )
With the available technology as given by (3.6), firms in the IRS-sector spend 
all their revenues on modified labour. We can thus derive the number of workers 
employed in the IRS-sector:
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% M„ =Lxf/=nHpl,' -° )( £ h /> '0 - ' > +EFP r ' ^ )  ■ (3.18)
Recalling from (3.10) that nH = g(tH) LxH, we can substitute (3.10) into (3.18) 
and solve for PH:
p H=
r r 
1
\ \
s Oh'IPh
(1  - O )
-1
r r^ r (3.19)
JJ
With the analogous expression for PF, we have a simultaneous equation system 
with two equations and two unknowns. Using the expression for PF in (3.19) and 
rearranging, we can finally yield:
?H =
1
(1 - x 2(1 -g))E h
1 ■ d - o )
W  -1
g ( t H) P H ~ a) g ( t F) p KF
( l - o )
rr^oy (3.20)
JJ
It can be easily seen that the price index PH depends on c , the transportation 
cost T, expenditure level EH, the price levels of individual varieties in Home and 
Foreign and the transformation function g(t) in the two regions. These in turn, except 
for a  and x, depend on the tax rate tH. The Home government can now maximise its 
citizens’ utility, as given by (3.2), by choosing the optimal tax rate.
3.2 The Nash equilibrium in tax rates
In contrast to the autarky case, the Home government in the two-region case 
has to take into account the strategic interaction with the government in the identical 
Foreign region when setting its optimal tax rate. This strategic interaction can be 
modelled as a single stage game with the players being the governments in the two 
identical regions. The strategy space for each government is the tax rate tj e  [0 ; 1]. 
The pay-off for the Home government is given by the indirect utility level (expression
8 1
(3.2) and (3.20)), and similarly for the Foreign region. Substituting the relevant 
expressions for the individual prices in Home and Foreign - which are analogous to 
expression (3.8) - and (3.16) into (3.20) and partially differentiating VH with respect 
to tH, while holding everything else constant, we can derive the best response function  
for Home:
(y
i.e. Home’s government chooses its tax rate, while taking Foreign’s tax rate as 
parametric.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, a similar expression must also hold for 
Foreign. We once again have a system of simultaneous equations with two equations 
and two unknowns (the tax rates). Using the expression for Foreign in (3.21) and 
noting that tax rates have to be equal in the two regions, we can derive Proposition 
3.2:
PROPOSITION 3.2  At the symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, both 
governments set the same tax rate tT* which is given by57:
1+ (Y-Q)  g«r*)  ( l - T « - > )  (3.22)
a ( l - y )  g ' ( t T*) ( l - T 0 -”')
where the subscript T denotes-the two-region case. It can easily be seen that the 
autarky case of (3.12) can be derived from (3.22) by setting t —> <*>.
57 Computer simulations suggest that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is also unique as other tax rate 
combinations do not satisfy the second-order conditions for a welfare maximum.
Once again, using the specific functional form as given by g(t) = rj te, we can 
derive an explicit expression for tT*:
t „ =__________ e ( l - y ) ( l - ,r( | -°>)__________ ^
T £(1 - y )(1 - t ° ' <’)) + ( l  —y/cr)( 1 - t 2<1“‘,>) ’
which simplifies to expression (3.12’) for x —> «>.
3.3 The effects of changes in x
In this subsection we want to analyse the effects of closer economic integration 
on the optimal tax rate in the two-region case. Differentiating (3.22’) with respect to 
T yields:
d t T*
dx
(3.23)
g (1 - y ) e ( l  -cr)(y - a ) T ' a[(l - t 2(1_ct)) - 2 t (1"g)(1 - t (1_0))]
(ct(1 - y ) e ( l  - x (1“0)) - ( y  - a ) ( l  -T2(1"a)))2
The sign of expression (3.23) depends on the value of the term within the 
square brackets. It can be shown that this term is positive except for the extreme cases 
of t —> 1 and/or a —» 1. For all other parameter values the expression is unambiguously 
positive. We can therefore state:
PROPOSITION 3.3 Except fo r  the extreme parameter values o f  T —> 1 and/or O—> 
1, closer economic integration leads to a lower equilibrium value o f the tax 
rate tT*.
It is thus that closer economic integration - due to a fall in transportation cost - 
leads generally to lower tax rates in equilibrium, giving rise to inefficiently low public
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good provision. Numerical values for the two cases of autarky and two-region scenario 
are provided in the following two tables. Using 8 = 1  and y  = 0.5, we list in Table
3.1 the optimal tax rate as a function of o  for the autarky case. In Table 3.2, we then 
list the optimal tax rates as a function of o  and T for the two-region scenario.
Autarkv case 
t*
a  = 3 
0.375
0  = 4 
0.364
0  = 5 
0.357
o —
0.334
Optimal tax rates in the autarky 
Table 3.1
case
Two-region case a  = 3 nto Q ii a-»°o
for T = 1.05: tT* 0.240 0.235 0.234 0.334
for x = 2: tT* 0.343 0.337 0.343 0.334
for % —» oo; tx* 0.375 0.364 0.357 0.334
Optimal tax rates in the two-region case
Table 3.2
It can be seen that the values in Table 3.2 are lower than the ones in Table 3.1 
except for T -> oo and for o  -> <*>. In the latter case (3.22) also simplifies to the autarky 
expression with o  —> In that case intra-industry trade would not arise as the goods 
produced are perceived to be perfect substitutes and consumers would not improve 
their welfare by consuming imported goods. Also note the effects of an increase in o  
on t*: in (3.13) we showed that an increase in o  leads to a fall in t* in the autarky 
case. For the two-region case, there are now two opposing effects: on the one hand,
84
the effect as described in (3.13) still exists, on the other hand it also leads to a fall in 
intra-industry trade and thus would lead to an increase in tx*.
This model generates the same ‘inefficiency in regional tax policies’ result as 
generally obtained by the local public goods literature. However, the mechanism at 
work is quite different. Intuitively the following is happening: regional governments 
finance the provision of the local public good by levying a tax on domestic workers’ 
income. The cost of providing the regional public good therefore fully falls on the 
domestic citizens. The benefit of provision, however, does not fall on the domestic 
citizens alone: as the regional public good is productive in nature, it is necessary and 
beneficial to the IRS-sector. The benefit of provision therefore is embedded in the 
tradeable x-good. In the autarky case this does not matter as trade does not occur - so 
that the benefit can be fully enjoyed by the domestic citizens. The tax rate is then 
efficiently set by the regional government. With trade foreign consumers also enjoy 
the benefit of domestic public good provision (the lower production cost) and hence 
the benefit to the domestic consumers is lower than in the autarky case: Foreign free- 
rides on the domestically provided public good. This "outflow of benefit" is higher, 
the higher the volume of trade between the two regions. We can thus provide another 
reason why decentralised decision-making itself can lead to an underprovision of 
public goods. Gordon argues that this ‘...[l]ess efficient ... outcome ... arises because 
one community’s decisions affects in many ways the utility levels of residents of other 
communities, yet these effects are ignored in the decision-making. The types of 
externalities ... were as follows:
(1) Nonresidents may pay some of the taxes.
(2) Nonresidents may receive some of the benefits from public services...’ (Gordon, 
1983, p. 580).
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3.4 The ‘degree of ineffectiveness*
The effect of lower trade costs on the ‘degree of ineffectiveness’ in public 
good provision can be analyzed by looking at the ratio of the optimal tax rate under 
trade conditions to the optimal tax rate under autarky. Define f = t*T / t* so that:
t J r * = ( e ( l  - y )  + l - y / g ) ( l  - t (l~g>) (324)
** ( e ( l  - y ) ( l  - t(‘-0))+ (1  - y / o ) ( l  - t 2'1^ ) )
Analytically, we can find that:
dj_ =
(1 - a ) ( l  - y / a ) ( e ( l  - y )  + l - y / a ) T “a[ ( l  -T 2(1_a)) - 2 t {I_0)(1 > / < q
(e ( l  - y ) ( l  - t (1-0))+(1  - 7 / a ) ( l  - t 2'1"0*)) 
(3.25)
The sign of expression (3.25) depends on the value of the term in the square 
brackets. As in the case of Proposition 3.3, it can be shown that the term is positive 
except for the parameter values of T —> 1 and/or a  —> 1. We can therefore say that in 
general, the higher the transportation cost t ,  the closer is the optimal tax rate in the 
two-region case to the autarky tax rate. The ratio approaches one from below for t  
—» oo.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the ratio as defined in (3.24) as a function of 
transportation cost t  for e = 1, y = 0.5, and three values o f a ( a  = 3, a  = 5 and a  
—> oo ). Note that for a  —» trade does not exist between the two regions, so that 
efficient tax rates are set regardless of the transportation cost.
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0.9B
0.96
0.92
0.9
Degree of ineffectiveness 
Figure 3.1
The two governments are "locked into" a coordination problem: both regions 
would be better off with higher tax rates as the inputs are not efficiently used, 
however a regional government would not unilaterally raise its tax rate to the efficient 
level. The Nash equilibrium in tax rates supports inefficiently low tax rates.
4. Welfare effects of economic integration and tax coordination
The above discussion suggests that regional governments have an incentive to 
provide the local public good inefficiently as regions open up to trade with other, 
identical regions. This incentive therefore reduces or even offsets any direct benefit 
from closer economic integration. To reap the full benefit of trade liberalisation, both 
governments should agree to delegate the policy making to a central planner who 
would take into account the "outflow of benefit"58 on the two-region level. To see this, 
let us assume the existence of an organisation which sets a uniform, welfare-
58 The line of reasoning is similar the one suggested by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) - see page 69.
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maximising tax rate across both regions59. Tax revenues are then evenly split between 
the regions to provide the local public goods. Everything else remains the same.
PROPOSITION 3.4  Welfare levels in the regions are maximised when the two 
regions delegate their policy-making power to a central planner. This policy 
regime avoids the problem o f under-provision and therefore always offers 
higher welfare levels than i f  the regional governments were responsible fo r  the 
policy themselves. Also, the difference in welfare levels is the larger the lower 
the transportation costs between the two regions.
Proof. See Appendix 3B. □
Figure 3.2 illustrates the above argument for the parameter values e = 1, y  = 
0 .5 , a  =  4  and rj = 1.
59 Admittedly, this setup is open to criticism: "The first... purpose ... is to argue for a more substantive 
analytical role for the federal government ...: for a recognition that the federal government is best 
treated as a player in its own right, not introduced as a mechanical device for tidying the loose ends 
left by horizontal interactions between the states." and furthermore "...[t]he federal government has often 
been seen as having two fiscal roles: redistribution across the states of the federation „„ and 
internalising fiscal externalities ... between the states... The federal government might achieve this 
internalisation by a variety of means. It might coordinate the decisions of the states... The essence of 
all these schemes, ..., is the same. In attempting to undo the consequences of horizontal externalities, 
the federal government seeks to bring the economy as close as possible to the (constrained) optimal 
unitary outcome" (Keen, 1996, pp. 1-3).
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0.29
0.285 coordinated case
0.28
uncoordinated  case0.275
Utility in uncoordinated and coordinated cases 
Figure 3.2
Both regions would therefore be better off by delegating the decision making 
to the central planner. The gains from coordination become bigger the larger the 
volume of trade between the two regions. Furthermore, it can be seen that for low 
values of t ,  the welfare level in the "uncoordinated" case can actually decline despite 
the reduction in trade costs, i.e. the incentive to under-provide the public good more 
than offsets the direct gains from lower transportation costs.
5. Concluding remarks
This chapter focused on the effects of intra-industry trade on the tax raising 
and local public good provision behaviour of regional governments. Using methods 
developed in the ‘new international’ trade literature in a fiscal competition style 
framework, it was shown that product mobility can give rise to the same ‘inefficiency 
in regional tax policies’ result as generally derived in the local public goods literature. 
In contrast to that literature however, we did not require taxation on mobile factors 
to derive the result - the existence of local public goods which affect the production 
process of monopolistically-competitive firms sufficed.
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As long as trade takes place, the benefit of the local public good provision - 
which is embedded in the traded goods - would have to be shared with foreign 
consumers, whereas the full burden of financing the provision would be on the 
domestic citizens. This outflow of benefit would then give rise to the inefficiency in 
regional tax policies. This result would not hold if we followed the fiscal competition 
literature in assuming that the local public good enters the utility function of domestic 
consumers directly. In that case, the whole benefit of provision would remain in the 
tax-raising region and regional governments would always choose the efficient tax 
rate. The result would also not arise within the framework of perfectly-competitive 
firms as trade would not arise between identical countries.
Another result of this chapter was that tax coordination, e.g. delegating the tax- 
setting policy to a central planner, unambiguously raises welfare levels in the regions 
as it avoids the problem of local public good underprovision. It was also shown that 
the incentive for a regional government to underprovide the local public good is 
higher, the higher the volume of trade between the two regions. Holding everything 
else constant, a reduction in transport costs between the two regions could thus even 
lead to a fall in welfare level. This observation has clear policy implications: in a 
European Union context, for instance, along with closer economic integration, regional 
policies should become more coordinated. And the need to coordinate continues to rise 
as the benefit from coordination become the larger, the more integrated the regions 
become.
However, could a regional government increase its citizens’ welfare without 
relying on policy coordination with another government or delegating responsibility 
to a supra-national organisation? From Figure 3.2 it can be seen that a regional 
government could increase its citizens’ welfare by artificially increasing the transport 
costs between the regions as long as the degree of economic integration is very high. 
Such a policy could, for example, require imposing tariffs on the imported goods. This 
would not only reduce the demand for imported goods, but it would also generate
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additional government revenues which could be used to provide the public good. This 
opens new possibilities for a regional government. For example, we could imagine that 
the government generates its revenues entirely from tariffs and not from levying taxes 
on its citizens. This policy would then not only reduce the degree of economic 
integration, but would also raise the disposable income of the citizens. An analysis of 
these alternative policies is, however, outside the scope of this chapter.
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Appendix 3A
Proof o f Proposition 3.1:
Recalling that w = 1 and using equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.8), (3.10) and (3.11a), 
we are able to derive the key expression for indirect utility in this economy:
v-g -(i-y)o -O-Y) (A3.1)
Differentiating V with respect to t yields the welfare maximising tax rate t* as 
given by expression (3.12) in the text. The second order condition is given by:
d2V
I t 2
( Y  - o )
=rjao( l  - y ) a( y  - 1 ) ( 1  - a ) -2
(Y - a ) ( f - 2 e a ( l  - t ) )  ,, , ,_2
. i i  —------------1------ _ + ( ( e a ( Y - l ) + a - l ) e a r  2
(1 - t)2t
(A3.2)
where a = (y - 1) / (1 - a). It can be shown that the above expression for t = t* and 
all appropriate parameter values is negative, i.e. it satisfies the condition for a 
maximum.
Appendix 3B
Proof o f Proposition 3.4:
To prove Proposition 3.4, we first of all have to find the optimal tax rate in the 
coordinated case. Given the assumption that taxes are set at the same rates across both 
regions, we have EH = EF, and the same transformation functions and prices by 
individual firms. We also know that in such a case PH = PF so that (3.18) in 
combination with (3.10) can be rewritten as:
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i = s(/)/> |1'<’>(£7>(0"l)( i  + t(I (B3.1)
(B3.1) can be solved for P:
r 1 (B3.2)P =
v g(t )aE ( l  + t (1-ct)) /
Substituting (B3.2) into (3.2) in the main text, we can find the indirect utility 
under the coordinated scheme. We can easily show that the optimal tax rate of the 
autarky case as given by (3.12) and (3.12’) also maximises utility for the coordinated 
scheme. This utility level has to be compared with the uncoordinated case in which 
every region is maximising its own utility, ignoring the other region’s policies. The 
utility level in that case can be found by substituting (3.22) and the analogous 
expression for Foreign into (3.20) and then using that expression in (3.2). We could 
compare the resulting utility levels analytically but it is more illuminating to represent 
the utility levels in Figure 3.2.
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Chapter 4
Urban zoning, imperfect competition 
and land-developers
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1. Introduction
The theory of land zoning analyses the motivations for government intervention 
in the land market of cities or regions: ‘[F]our motivations have been advanced as 
determinants of zoning decisions. The traditional view, known as externality zoning, 
is that zoning regulations, particularly land-use regulations, serve to reduce the 
external costs that may be generated when incompatible uses are in proximity to one 
another. Additionally, zoning may be used to attract residents whose contributions to 
tax revenues exceed their consumption of public services... This rationale is called 
fiscal zoning. Another motivation for promulgating zoning regulations, known as 
exclusionary zoning, is a desire to bar certain ethnic groups or social classes from 
occupying a jurisdiction. Finally, the value of land in alternative uses may guide 
zoning decisions’ (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994, pp. 602-603). In an excellent survey 
Pogodzinski and Sass continue to analyse zoning and ‘...[djivide the effects of zoning 
on economic agents into six broad categories: supply-side effects, demand-side effects, 
Tiebout effects, externality effects, endogenous zoning, and rent-seeking behaviour...’ 
(Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990, p. 294). They stress that externalities are the usual raison 
d ’etre for zoning regulation and that these support zoning policies on welfare grounds. 
Much of the literature thus deals with the question under which circumstances zoning 
is welfare-improving when compared to the market equilibrium.
This chapter contributes to the theory of zoning in several ways. In the first 
section we look at market imperfections created by monopolistically-competitive firms. 
This setup has been used, for example, extensively in the ‘new international trade 
theory’ (Krugman, 1979) but not generally in the context of urban zoning. Does 
monopolistic competition create another reason why policy makers should intervene 
in the allocation of land? We answer this question by looking at a fixed-size urban 
region with only one production/retailing site in which monopolistically-competitive 
firms and households compete for the use of land. Comparing the welfare level
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obtained by a central planner (e.g. the local government) with the one attained in the 
market equilibrium, we find that there is indeed a role for government intervention.
In the second section we use the basic structure of the one-site economy such 
as consumer preferences and production technologies and extend it to the case with 
one centrally located and one out-of-town site. By doing so, we introduce ‘distance’ 
and different levels of accessibility of the central market from the two sites due to 
transportation cost into the model. This setup is used to study several models of urban 
land-use zoning. The first question we address is where and how much land the local 
government should zone for production/retailing use, taking into account the different 
levels of accessibility of the central market from the two sites. We assume initially 
that the local government is the only large-scale agent involved and has sole control 
over the two business districts.
In this context, a particular industry to think about is retailing and especially 
‘comparison shopping’. Shopping can be split into two subgroups, the first is 
‘convenience shopping’ which includes essentials such as bread, milk or newspapers 
and is normally done locally, the second is ‘comparison shopping’ for which 
consumers are prepared to travel some distance. This includes shopping for consumer 
durables such as computers, household appliances, furniture or other bulky goods 
(LPAC, 1994a). The last two decades have seen a revolution in consumption and 
retailing behaviour: ‘[increasing affluence has been associated with a rise in car 
ownership and much greater mobility. Given the improvement in roads, people are 
now able and willing to travel far greater distances for their shopping’ (Bromley and 
Thomas, 1993, p. 3). Consequently, many retail parks have opened on the city 
fringes, redirecting consumption away from the established town centre shopping 
facilities. The opening of out-of-town facilities frequently has effects on the traditional 
centres: ‘[Although larger city centres endure much new competition, further down 
the retail hierarchy there are high vacancy rates, store losses, smaller units and 
pressure to alter uses...’ (Westlake, 1993, p. 175). This ‘pressure to alter uses’ has led
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to the redevelopment of formerly production/retailing sites into residential space in 
may central locations (LPAC, 1994b).
On the positive side though, it has been argued that the developments have 
increased the supply of land and hence reduced the rental price of land; this 
potentially has led to a fall in the price level in general. Furthermore planners must 
also see the potential advantages such as more choice for shoppers (McGoldrick, 
1992). Finally, the increased competition has led to the improvement of many existing 
town centres - to the benefit of the consumer: ‘[T]he negative effects of regional out- 
of-town shopping centres on CBDs ... can be mitigated by the redevelopment and 
enhancement of traditional centres, which can be seen as important positive responses 
to retail change’ (Bromley and Thomas, 1993, p. 145).
It has to be remembered though that local governments rarely play an active 
role in the physical development of business or retail parks; their role is generally 
limited to granting the planning permission for the development and trying to 
participate in the potential planning gain. The active role is normally performed by 
profit-maximising absentee land-developers. This observation forms the basis for the 
following sections of this chapter. We study-in which way urban land zoning can be 
affected by the existence of absentee land-developers. In this context the many retail 
parks and shopping centres which have been developed outside towns come to mind 
(Lakeside (Thurrock) and Meadowhall (Sheffield) in the early 1990s are two prime 
examples in England).
Surprisingly, not much attention has been given to the importance of land- 
developers in the process of city development and the location decisions of firms so 
far: Henderson and Slade (1992) and Henderson and Mitra (1995) have focused on 
related issues. The former use simulation results to analyse whether competing land- 
developers develop land adjacent to (a monocentric outcome) or distant from each 
other (a duocentric outcome). The latter study the optimal behaviour of a land-
98
developer (its optimal location decision and capacity choice) when maximising against 
an established and passive Central Business District (CBD) in which the capacity is 
fixed.
This chapter is more closely related to the latter. However, the capacity of the 
CBD is not taken to be fixed. We ask how a local government should respond to the 
emergence of absentee land-developers which transfer their profits out of the local 
economy when the local government is still in charge of zoning of the CBD. Does this 
outflow of profits justify a different zoning policy for the CBD to the case in which 
the government was in charge of zoning in both business districts? We argue that this 
depends crucially on the location of the out-of-town development. If it is within the 
city’s jurisdiction, the government can levy a tax on profits and thus recoup some or 
all of the outflow. If it is outside the jurisdiction though, then the local government 
has no legislative power to levy taxes on profits and has to resume to other polices. 
In the context of the model we suggest that zoning could be an appropriate policy 
instrument. The local government could act as a second land-developer and compete 
with the out-of-town developer in the supply of land. Admittedly our case is specific 
in that we assume only one market place for goods - the city residents themselves. 
This implies that the land supply within the city-ultimately determines the rental price 
of land within and outside the city. This might not be too unrealistic to assume 
though: out-of-town developments are frequently built to serve just one market place - 
the town it is attached to.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 models the city with one CBD. 
The optimal zoning policy is derived and compared to the market outcome which 
would arise without zoning. We find that the existence of monopolistically-competitive 
firms creates a need for land zoning in our setup. Using the framework of section 2 
as a building block, we introduce in section 3 a second production site which is out- 
of-town and potentially less accessible than the centre. The optimal zoning policy and 
the corresponding distribution of firms across the two sites are derived when both sites
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are developed and run by the city government. It is shown which factors affect the 
optimal policy. Section 4 introduces a profit-maximising land-developer which 
develops the out-of-town site and earns the corresponding land rent. The government’s 
optimal zoning of the CBD is derived and compared to the case in section 3. In 
subsection 4.4 we analyse the case in which the out-of-town site is within the city’s 
jurisdiction. Section 5 concludes.
2. A city with one production site 
2.1. Citizens’ utility
Let us consider a city which is inhabited by L identical residents whose utility 
depends on the consumption of the goods h, x and y60:
(4 -!)
where h is the amount of land for residential use per capita (h for housing), X is the 
consumption of an aggregate of goods x produced by an increasing-retums-to-scale 
(IRS)-sector and y is consumption of a good produced under constant-retums-to-scale 
(CRS). The fraction 1 - a - b of income is spent on residential land, a is the fraction 
spent on the IRS-sector and b the fraction spent on the CRS-sector. It is assumed that 
1 - a - b is constant, whereas the values of a and b (with a + b < 1 and constant and 
a, b > 061) can vary, representing a shift in consumer tastes from consuming IRS- 
sector goods to CRS-sector goods or vice versa.
60 This setup is loosely based on Helpman (1995).
61 This assumption implies that all three goods are always demanded and hence each sector exists.
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2.2 Factor markets - the supply of labour and land
Labour and land are the only factors of production in the city. Each resident 
is endowed with one unit of labour and can supply the unit irrespective of the distance 
between residential and job location. Without loss of generality we set L = 1.
A ssu m p t io n  4.1
Commuting costs in the city are zero. This implies that citizens can offer the 
same amount of labour supply regardless of the distance between their 
residential and job location.
Turning to land supply, it is assumed that the city is confined spatially to be 
along a line of unit length. Demand for land then has to be met by land supply from 
within this city. There are several reasons why the city’s size could be limited. The 
first reason is due to topographical features. Cities in coastal regions, for example, are 
often faced with mountains further inland, representing a natural barrier to expansion 
(Barcelona is such a city). Another reason could be the political status of-the city: 
Singapore and Hongkong, to mention just two cases, are "city states" and therefore 
limited in size. These natural or territorial barriers to urban sprawl have led to high 
population densities and relatively high land prices in these cities. A third reason why 
land supply could be limited is because of some political decision. In the United 
Kingdom, green- belts were introduced to provide an artificial barrier to urban sprawl 
(Hall, 1973), with governments in other countries pursuing similar policies: in the 
urban regions of Oslo and Amsterdam, for example, urban sprawl has been contained 
by the high price-of-obtaining an official permission to convert land from agricultural 
to urban use. As a consequence, the price of land with official permission for 
conversion is 115-times (in Oslo) and 80-times (in Amsterdam) higher than land 
without the official permission (HABITAT, 1996). The assumption made in this 
section therefore represents the extreme case in which the government refuses to grant 
planning permission. Another urban region in which urban sprawl has been contained
101
is Madrid which, despite its location in a desert-like environment, is compact and 
densely populated. These three examples represent a whole category of cities in upper- 
income countries, in which land use is highly regulated to the point where house 
prices rise as a consequence of artificially constrained land supply (HABITAT, 1996).
It is the assumption of limited land supply which gives rise to positive land 
rents in a city without commuting costs. In Appendix 4A we provide an informal 
discussion of a setup in which these assumptions are relaxed, i.e. we introduce 
commuting costs to determine the equilibrium size of the city. For what follows, we 
argue that the features of interest can also be captured by the simplified and less 
realistic version presented here.
2.3 The CRS and IRS-sectors
We make several strong assumptions regarding the CRS and IRS-sectors. First, 
the CRS-sector, which is perfectly competitive, is assumed to require only labour as 
an input factor. In the context of a ‘city economy", it is most appropriate to think of 
the CRS-sector as services and ‘convenience shopping’ (see introduction to this 
chapter). Many types of services and ‘convenience shopping’ (such as legal services, 
hairdressers, opticians, cornershops etc) are labour-intensive and we therefore assume 
that the CRS-sector does not require any land for production. We choose the CRS- 
sector good as the numeraire and the units of production in that sector in such a way 
that one unit of output requires one unit of labour input. This implies py = wy = 1, 
where py is the price of the CRS-sector good and wy is the wage paid to CRS-sector 
workers.
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Turning to the IRS-sector, the consumption aggregate X as introduced in (4.1) 
follows Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and is given by62:
( c - l )
X  = X:
i = l
o
Terry (4.2)
where Xj denotes output of an individual firm i and n the number of different varieties 
consumed. According to (4.2) a large number of potential varieties enters utility in a 
symmetric way with a  > 1 representing the elasticity of substitution between any two 
varieties.
Production of the final output Xj requires two stages: in the first, an 
intermediate input z is produced with Cobb-Douglas technology, combining land and 
labour:
z = ^ I' MLJCM, (4*3)
where sx is the amount of land available for industrial use, Lx the number of workers 
in the IRS-sector and p, such that 0 < p < 1, represents the importance of labour in 
this stage of the production process and the share of industry revenues accrued to 
labour. In the second stage of production, IRS-sector firms produce x with a fixed cost 
a  and constant marginal cost (3, using z as the only input factor, so that Z; = a  + p xr
62 The price index for the differentiated products is the dual to (4.2) and is given by:
f
P =
n
E p .
1 -o
1
( 1 - 0 )
1=1
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Given the demand structure described by (4.2), each individual firm i 
maximises its profit by setting a price as a mark-up over the marginal cost MC of 
production. Following standard analysis we can derive: = a  p MCj / ( a  - 1) where
M Q = rxl_M w*1.
A ssu m p t io n  4 .2
Land within the city is atomistically owned by citizens. The supply of land is 
therefore perfectly competitive.
Using Assumption 4.2 and assuming labour mobility between the sectors - 
which implies wy = wx = w = 1 - we can derive from (4.3) the price of land in the 
industrial zone rx in terms of the wage w: rx = (1 - p) Lx / (p sx). Without loss of 
generality let us choose a  =  1 /  a  and p =  (a  - 1) /  a .  With that simplification, we 
can express p4 in terms of the return on land. It can also be shown that each firm 
charges the same price in equilibrium. Hence:
\i -n
p = P r
( i - M) (4.4)
Free entry and exit of firms into the IRS-sector leads to zero profits in 
equilibrium and determines a unique output level per firm: x = Xj = a  ( a  - l ) / p  = 
1. In order to produce exactly one unit of final output, an individual firm requires 
exactly one unit of z. This implies that the number of firms is proportional to z with 
n = z.
To summarise this subsection, both the CRS and IRS-sectors need labour as 
an input factor, whereas only the IRS-sector requires land as an input factor. However, 
land is also demanded by citizens for residential purposes so that there are competing 
uses for both input factors. Finally, let us impose factor market clearing so that sx + 
sh = s = 1, where sh is the amount of space not used by the IRS-sector and hence
104
available for residential use. We also have Lx + Ly = L = 1, where Ly is the fraction 
of the labour force which works in the CRS-sector. Figure 4.1 depicts a potential 
scenario for this city.
Residential area Central Business District Residential area 
I----------------------1---------- 1---------- 1---------------------
0 0.5 s . s 0.5 s* h
A city with one (central) business district 
F igure 4.1
This is a standard modelling approach as stated in Stull who, following Alonso 
(1964), states that ‘...[l]and in this economy has only two potential economic uses: as 
a location for residential activities or as a location for manufacturing activities’ (Stull, 
1974, p. 337). Note however that the scenario presented in Figure 4.1 entirely depends 
on the assumption of a central business district - denoted by CBD. Other 
configurations are equally possible as we do not have commuting cost in our setup.
2.4 The allocation of resources - the social p lanner’s zoning problem
In this subsection we discuss the allocation of resources across the different 
uses. First, as stated above we assume that labour is perfectly mobile between the two 
sectors. Second, regarding the allocation of land across its uses, we make the 
following assumption:
105
A ssu m p t io n  4 .3
A social planner (e.g. here the local government) is in charge of allocating 
land between industrial and residential use - trying to maximise citizens’ utility 
as given by (4.1). The procedure is referred to as zoning63.
Looking at Figure 4.1 again, it is the social planner who decides on the 
expansion of the (central) business district, marked by the two small vertical lines 
defining the central business district.
2.5 Solving the model
The social planner maximises citizens’ utility by choosing the optimal size of 
the CBD, taking the industry structures as described in section 2.3 as given. Denoting 
total income in the economy with E, we know that X = a E Px_1 and y = b E. We also 
have h L '1 = h = sh = (1 - sx). We can rewrite expression (4.1) as the social planner’s 
objective function:
where sx is its choice variable.
To find the optimal value of sx, we need to find E and Px: for example, from 
(4.4) we see that a larger sx would lead, ceteris paribus, to a lower individual price. 
Given the production function (4.3) it would also lead, once again ceteris paribus, to
63 We use the terms ‘production’, ‘industrial’ and ‘retail’ land use to describe the same activity. In the 
context of our model we can imagine that producers sell their products on their premises. The closest 
form of retailing to that are factory outlets - a common form of retailing in the USA and more and 
more so in Europe as well: ‘[lit may be too soon to positively identify a fifth wave [of retail 
decentralisation] but the durable goods Factory Outlet Centre is emerging as a further form of 
decentralisation. The factory shop, of which there are estimated to be at least 1400 scattered around 
Britain, sells manufacturers’ products directly to the public...’ (Walker, 1996, p. 165).
(4.1’)
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a larger supply of z and hence to more variety. This in turn would reduce the price 
index Px. However, p also depends on Lx. In order to find Lx, we have to turn to the 
demand side of the economy.
First note that total income E in the city consists of labour income, rental 
income from the industrial sector and housing income H:
E= w L+ r s +H , (4.5)
X  X  ’
where from (4.1) H = (1 - a - b) E. With w L = 1 and rx as given above, we can 
rewrite (4.5):
E = . 1
( a  + b )
(4.5’)
Lx can be found by noting that workers spend the fraction a of their income 
on IRS-sector goods so that total revenues to IRS-sector firms is a E. From (4.3) it 
follows that firms spend the fraction p of their total revenues to pay their wage bill. 
We can easily rearrange (4.5’) to get:
L  = a|J . (4.6)
'  (b+a[i)
Expressions (4.3), (4.4) and (4.6) then give us the price index Px (see footnote 
62) as a function of sx.
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PROPOSITION 4.1 The optimal zoning policy is a function o f a, b, a  and p  and 
dedicates the fraction sx* o f land to industrial land use:
s * =________~ a o (  1_-p)________
( 1 - a - f c ) ( l - a ) - a a ( l -p)
Proof See Appendix 4B. □
Performing simple comparative statics, we find that the effects of changes of 
the different parameter values on s*x are given by s*xa > 0, s*xa < 0 and s*XM < 0. 
These effects are derived in Appendix 4B. A higher value of a reflects the fact that 
consumers spend a larger fraction of their income on IRS-sector goods and less on the 
"y"-type good. To meet this increase in demand, supply should also be raised. This 
requires increasing sx. The higher the value of p, the less important is land as an input 
factor in the first stage of production (see (4.3)). This implies that the marginal cost 
of production MC - and hence the price of an individual variety - falls. Ceteris 
paribus, a higher value of p thus gives rise to a lower price index. The benefits of a 
lower price index can then be enjoyed already with a smaller industrial site. For 
illustrative purposes, we present numerical values for a = 0.35, b = 0.35, p = 0.75, and 
three different values of o  in Table 4.1:
a sx* u_ n
2 0.37 0.47 0.41
3 0.30 0.55 0.39
4 0.28 0.58 0.38
Optimal zoning of CBD 
Table 4.1
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Finally, a higher value of o  reflects a lower preference for variety by 
consumers. Given that variety is directly proportional to n (and therefore z) and the 
fact that Lx is constant, sx* falls (see (4.3)).
Given the optimal zoning policy as stated in Proposition 4.1, we can find the 
corresponding land rents in the industrial and the residential areas. Using the 
expression for rx, (4.6) and (4.7) we find rx*:
r * = _ ( ( l - a - * > ) ( l - g ) - a q ( l - M ) )  (4.8a)
x ( b + a\i)o
The price for one unit of residential land can be found by deriving sh* = (1 
sx*) and noting that rh* = (1 - a - b) E / sh*:
r * = ( ( i - a - f t ) n - q ) - q q ( i - H ) )  (4.8b>
( fc+ap) ( l  - a )
rh* can be derived implicitly as we have not modelled the housing market 
explicitly. The ratio rx* / rh* is given b y - ( l  - a ) / a  < 1, i.e. the rental price of land 
should be lower in the industrial area than in the residential area for all values of a  
except f o r  a  —> o o  (the case of perfect competition)64. The smaller a , the more highly 
is variety valued by consumers. This preference can only be met by allocating more 
land to industrial use which leads to a fall in rx. Less land for residential use (with 
fixed expenditure level on it) directly leads to an increase in rh. In other words, the 
production of the IRS-sector should be indirectly subsidised.
64 This might sound surprising but note that the general (opposite) result in the urban economics literature 
is driven by the commuting cost within the city. The scenario depicted in Figure 4.1 is just one 
example. Our industrial site could also be at the city edge or it could even be split in two sites at the 
city edges. What matters in this setup is the size of the business district - not its location. However we 
follow standard modelling techniques by assuming the Central Business District.
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2.6 Utility level under zoning allocation versus market allocation of land
So far we have not shown that the optimal allocation of land by a central 
planner leads to a different welfare level than by market forces alone. In order to 
justify the central planner’s intervention, we have to demonstrate that utility is higher 
in the case of intervention. To do so, we have to find the market allocation of land.
Rem a r k  4.1
The (non-zoning) spatial equilibrium in the city is characterised when all 
households/ firms are, respectively, equally well-off and neither households nor 
firms can raise their utility/ profits by moving to a different location within the 
city.
Remark 4.1 implies that without commuting cost and a constant wage, the land 
rent must be equalised across the entire city: rh = rx = r65. Why? Suppose that land 
rents were different across the two sites with rh > rx. A firm would never move: a 
deviant firm would face the same labour cost but r would be higher, so that its 
marginal cost of production would rise - leading to negative profits in the light of a 
given price px. However, citizens would relocate: spending (1 - a - b) E of total 
income on housing, an individual would get more space to live on in the industrial 
site. Note that an individual is indifferent between living in the residential or the 
industrial site as there are no negative externalities etc.
PROPOSITION 4 .2  Land use zoning policy increases the welfare level in the city 
when compared to the (non-zoning) spatial equilibrium outcome. This is 
because zoning takes into account the pecuniary externality created by the 
monopolistically-competitive industry.
65 Note that total income E remains constant throughout our discussion. Hence zoning does not affect 
citizens’ total income.
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Proof: It can easily be shown that sx = (1 - ja) a / ((1 - a - b) + (1 - p) a) 
equalises the land rent across the residential- and industrial land. The market 
allocates too little land to industrial use. Substituting sx* from (4.7) and sx as 
above into (4.1), and taking ratios we find that:
f \ - s x*){l~a~b)
1  - S _ s  *\ x /
a o ( l ~ H )
( l - o ) (4.9)
where u,* represents the utility level with zoning and u, without zoning. This ratio is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2:
Uf/Ui
1.009 
1.008 
1.007 
1.006 
1.005 
1.004
Ratio of welfare levels 
Figure 4.2
The ratio approaches one from above as a  goes to infinity. For a  —» °o (the case 
of perfect competition), zoning cannot improve over the market outcome. In the case 
of perfect competition, less land for industrial use would raise the MC and the price. 
A citizen would take this price increase into account when moving. With monopolistic 
competition though, not only does the individual price go up but also the price index 
as the number of firms decreases. The magnitude of this second effect depends on a. 
A citizen would not take into account this effect. We have described another
1 1 1
externality - a pecuniary rather than a technological - which gives rise to a 
misallocation of land by the market. There is a role for zoning.
3. A city with two potential production sites 
Zoning and development done by the local government
In the following sections we want to analyse alternative factors which might 
affect zoning policies. We therefore ignore the effects of market imperfections in the 
main part of the text, however, we provide numerical examples in Appendix 4D to 
support the findings made in section 2 of this chapter.
Let us relax the assumption made in section 2 that land supply is limited to the 
urban area. Instead we assume that the city’s metropolitan area extends beyond the 
city limits and that there is potential land to the east of the city itself66. This new site 
can be brought into use by the local government. All future rental income is then 
accrued to the city residents and channelled back into the local economy.
A s s u m p t io n  4.4
The out-of-town site can only be used as an industrial/retailing site. Arbitrarily,
the maximum size of the site is of unit length as well.
The local government has zoning power over land within and outside the city. 
In the following we assume that ‘zoned land’ is always also developed. Note that even 
though the maximum size is unity, the site zoned for industrial/retailing use can be 
anything between zero and one. Let us extend Assumption 4.1 to include the out-of- 
town site. This allows us to simplify the analysis without losing the aspects we are 
interested in analysing.
66 We can imagine that the city’s expansion to the west is limited by a lake etc. Obviously the setup is 
symmetric and we could reverse it.
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A ssu m pt io n  4.1 ’
Commuting costs remain zero even for commuting to and from and within the 
out-of-town site.
From now on let us refer to the out-of-town site as the Suburban Business 
District - SBD. To introduce the concept of relative accessibility to the urban market 
from the two different BDs, we assume that shipping final consumer goods from the 
SBD to the CBD is costly.
A ssu m pt io n  4 .5
The transportation of final consumer goods within the BDs is for free but 
shipment from the SBD to the CBD involves transportation cost. Furthermore, 
all goods produced in the SBD have to be shipped via its transportation node 
TNsbd to the city’s TNCBD so that the transportation cost depends on c - the 
cost per unit of distance - and the total distance D between the two TNs. 
Finally, we assume that TNSBD is always in the middle of the SBD67.
In Figure 4.3 we show an example in which the local government has decided 
to zone only half of the land available for zoning outside the city:
67 The last aspect of Assumption 4.5 obviously involves a strong assumption, however, we could imagine 
in the case of a production site a central railway terminal and in the case of a retailing complex a 
central car park or a central underground/bus station. The purpose of this assumption is to ensure that 
all firms face identical access to the city regardless of their location within the SBD.
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An urban area with two production sites 
Figure 4.3
where CE stands for city-edge. As in Figure 4.1, it is assumed that production/retailing 
within the city takes place at the central location, with the residential areas evenly 
located on both sides of it. Also note that in Figure 4.3, the area between 1.5 and 2 
is left unzoned (and hence undeveloped). Why this might be the case is discussed 
below.
To model the transportation cost, we choose ‘iceberg cost’ so that for every 
unit of output arriving at the city’s TNCBD, T units have to be shipped initially from 
the SBD’s TNsbd (with T > 1), the rest melts away68. Specifically, we follow Krugman 
and Venables (1995) and assume that T = ecD with c > 0 and D being the distance 
between TNCBD and TNSBD. Given that the distance from TNCBD to the city edge is 0.5
68 More appropriate for the retail sector might be the following interpretation: residents purchase goods 
in both centres, however, transporting the goods back from the SBD is costly. In that case it is the 
consumers who have to pay for the transportation cost directly.
and that TNSBD is in the middle of the SBD, we can easily see that D = Vi (1 + sxSBD), 
where sxSBD is the chosen size of the out-of-town-site69.
The local government, when choosing the size of the SBD, has to take into 
account that a larger SBD would offer more land supply but would also lead to higher 
transportation cost as the distance between the two transportation nodes is increased. 
Note the difference to Henderson and Mitra (1996): even though they assume space 
and distance between business districts, the actual business districts do not take up any 
space (their office space capacity is stacked vertically).
3.1 The allocation of firms across the two business districts
Given Assumption 4.1’, IRS-sector workers are indifferent between working 
in the CBD or SBD and hence wages are equalised across the two locations. The 
prices charged by the individual firms in each region therefore depend on the land 
rents alone and are given by:
P r
1 - |J  L X ,
M
s .xj
"M
(4.4’)
where subscript j = CBD, SBD. The amount of land sxj allocated for industrial use and 
the equilibrium distribution of labour (with LxCBD + LxSBD = Lx) determine pj.
PROPOSITION 4.3  In equilibrium, the price charged by a firm  in SBD at the 
factory gate must be lower than the price charged by a firm  in the CBD. The 
relationship between the two prices is given by pSBD = p CBD x(I Given
69 It is sometimes assumed that the land-developer has the size of its development (the capacity) and its 
location (the distance away from the city) as its choice variables (see for instance Henderson and Mitra, 
1996). The latter choice variable becomes an issue once other economic factors which create forces of 
dispersion are modelled. In our setup, the optimal location is always adjoining the city edge.
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(4.4'), this can also be written as: LxSBD /  s xSBD = Lx CBD /  s x CBD te, where e 
= (1 - a ) / ( ( l  - fi)<5) < 0.
Proof: As all varieties enter the utility function in a symmetric way (i.e. the 
setup is a quantity symmetry), every single firm has to sell the same quantity. 
Demand for each variety in the city centre can be found by applying Roy’s 
identity to expression (4.1*). We have:
x.
(du ldE)
('du/dpj)
(4.13)
Partially differentiating (4.1*) yields xCBD = a pCBD ° /  (Px(a + b) (b + a p)) 
and xSBD = a pSBD' ° T(1 ‘ a) / (Px (a + b) (b + a p)). Noticing that we require 
x c b d  =  x s b d » we can derive Proposition 4.3.
The equilibrium allocation of firms across the two BDs is attained when the 
condition stated in Proposition 4.3 is satisfied70. Using (4.4’), (4.6) and the above 
condition, we can determine the equilibrium distribution of Lx:
LxCBD=--------------------   (4.14a)
rB„ + ir„ n Tc)
and
L s s o - ( .  7 " ° ^ ------------------n  ’  ( 4 ' 1 4 b )
70 As an example, consider out-of-town retail parks which are in competition with centrally-located 
retailers. Consumers demand the same quantity in both locations but as they face the transportation cost, 
they expect a price in the out-of-town park which takes that into account.
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Note that the price index for IRS-sector goods as given by footnote (62) is now:
( 1- 0 )
P  CBD
(1 - o )
11 C B D  +  n  S B D  ^
(4.15)
where pCBD, nCBD and nSBD can be found from expressions (4.3), (4.4’), (4.14a) and 
(4.14b) and T as defined above.
3.2 The utility-maximising choice of sxCBD and sxSBD
The local government maximises utility given by (4.1’) by selecting the 
optimal values of sxCBD and sxSBD (and thus D). When doing so, it has to take into 
account that the price index as given by (4.15) depends crucially on the per unit 
transportation cost c. Using (4.14a), (4.14b) in (4.15) and choosing sxCBD and sxSBD 
determines nCBD and nSBD. This affects 6. Below we analyse several cases.
PROPOSITION 4 .4 a  For c = 0, the optimal zoning policy is to locate all 
industrial production (retailing activity) in the SBD and allocate all the urban 
area to residential use.
Proof: See Appendix 4C. □
This policy recommendation is obvious: without transportation cost, the local 
government should zone as much as possible in the SBD and as little as possible in 
the urban area itself. This frees land for residential use without the penalty of having 
to pay for the transportation of goods back into the city.
PROPOSITION 4 .4 b  For c —» the local government should ignore the potential 
SBD and allocate the land within the city limits as i f  it was the only area 
available fo r  zoning.
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Proof: (4.14a) and (4.14b) simplify to LxCBD = a p / (b + a p) = Lx, LxSBD = 0 
and Px = pCBD (nCBD + 0)1/(1 *a). With c -> 00, the SBD is unaccessible and no 
firm coul break-even in the SBD. The government should therefore the SBD: 
we are de facto back in the one-region case of section 2. Utility is maximised 
according to expression (4.7).
PROPOSITION 4 .4 c For intermediate values o f c, production o f the IRS-sector 
should take place in both locations, the exact amount o f which depends 
crucially on the level o f c.
Proof: As explicit first-order conditions to this maximisation problem cannot 
be found, we have to use numerical examples71.
As can be expected, the optimal values for this case lie between the extreme 
values as given in Propositions 4.4a and 4.4b. In Table 4.2a the optimal values of 
s x c bd  an(3 sxSBD are given in columns 2 and 3 as functions of the transportation cost c 
and a , with o  = 3. Rows 1 and 5 represent the two extreme cases as addressed in 
Propositions 4.4a and 4.4b (compare the values of row 5 with Table 4.1). The 
corresponding Tables 4.2b and 4.2c for (7 = 2 and (7 = 4 can be found in Appendix 
4D. For illustrative purposes, the corresponding utility levels and the number of firms 
in each BD are also given in columns 4 to I 12:
71 Nonetheless, the first-order conditions are derived in Appendix 4C.
72 For the numerical examples we have set a = 0.35, b= 0.35 and p = 0.75.
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o  = 3 
c o*xCBD ——xSBD u HcBD HsBD n
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.00 0.53 0.53
0.50 0.14 1.00 0.61 0.15 0.38 0.53
0.75 0.20 1.00 0.58 0.24 0.27 0.51
1.00 0.25 0.75 0.57 0.31 0.16 0.47
10.0 0.30 0.07 0.55 0.39 0.00 0.39
Optimal zoning of CBD and SBD for a  = 3 
Table 4.2a
For higher values of c, more land should be allocated to industrial use within 
the urban area and less in the SBD. Higher values of c force SBD Firms to charge 
relatively lower prices. The only way this could be achieved is by having lower rental 
prices for land - which in turn also depends on the allocation of workers across the 
two BDs (see (4.4’)). In equilibrium, for higher c, fewer firms can survive in the SBD. 
To relieve the pressure on land in the CBD, the best policy is to expand the CBD. 
This, ceteris paribus, reduces the prices charged by individual firms and the price 
index overall. Also note that as the SBD can be brought into use free of any cost 
(there are no development costs etc), it is obvious that the resulting utility levels are 
at least as high as in the single region case. In section 4.3 we interpret the values of 
s x s b d - Comparing the values between the tables, we find that a higher value of a  
should still lead to less land allocated to industrial use and hence less variety. The 
effect as illustrated in Table 4.1 is still relevant.
4. A city with two potential production sites 
Zoning and  development game with two large agents
Consider now a different setup in which the out-of-town site has to be 
developed by some independent, absentee land-developer instead o f the local
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government (see page 98 for a motivation). In which way(s) is the local government’s 
zoning policy affected by the presence of an absentee land-developer? To answer this 
question we assume that the local government is still in charge of zoning the CBD but 
has to take into account the absentee land-developer’s profit-maximising behaviour. 
The land-developer itself also has to take into account the local government’s policies 
when making its decisions. We assume that the decisions are taken simultaneously by 
the two agents. Given these assumptions, we describe the Nash equilibrium in 
development/zoning policies.
4.1 Total income in the city and the allocation of labour across the two districts
It is best to start this section by looking at the city residents’ total income E. 
Total income is derived from labour income, housing rent and rental income from the 
CBD only:
where the ‘bar’ is used to denote this new scenario. For a given size of the 
CBD (i.e. fixed capacity), a new out-of-town development leads to a fall in the rental 
price as the labour force is split across the two business districts. This is in line with 
real-life observations: new out-of-town developments frequently lead to the relocation 
of firms away from the old to the new district, lowering the intensity of usage of the 
CBD’s capacity and lowering the rental price in it. Total income to citizens falls by 
the amount of profit taken out by the developer. Using the expression for rxCBD , we 
can rearrange (4.16):
E=wL  +(1 - a - b ) E  +r (4.16)
' x C B D
(4.16’)
(a+b)]^ p /
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Given that the fraction a of income E is spent on IRS-sector goods (see (4.1)) 
and that IRS-sector firms spend the fraction p of their total revenues on labour, we 
find:
L = a\i
( a +b) 1  “ ------  x C B Dr
(4.6’)
From (4.6’) it can be seen that the more people are employed in the CBD, the 
more people are employed in the IRS-sector overall. This in turn would, ceteris 
paribus, raise the land rents in the two business districts. Noting that LxSBD = Lx - 
LxCBD, we can derive from (4.6’):
-  = a\i _ (b  +ap) -
xSBD (a + b ) (a + b ) xCBD'
(4.17)
Imposing Proposition 4.3 on (4.17), we can derive the following expression for
L'xCBD:
. • (4'18)
4.2. The profit-maximising, absentee land-developer
The land-developer tries to maximise its profit rxSBD sxSBD which is equal to the 
rental income of the SBD. Looking at (4.6’), (4.16’) and (4.18), it can be seen that the 
choice of SBD affects the total income in the city, the number of people working in 
the IRS-sector and also the number of people working in the CBD. This in turn might 
affect the CBD’s rental price - and thus also the SBD’s rental price rxSBD.
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Using Proposition 4.3, we can express the rental price in the SBD as a function 
of the transportation cost, the number of people working in the CBD and the CBD’s 
size:
r x S B D
_ (1 -p) LxSBD _ ( l -p) LxCBD ^e (4.19)
M S x S B D  P  S x C B D
Using (4.18) in (4.19) we can derive the land-developer’s objective function, 
i.e. its profit n:
k  (4.20)
(fc+ a(i)^cso+ ( a + f o ) ^ DTe
The land-developer chooses the value of sxSBD which maximises (4.20) - taking 
V bd as given.
PROPOSITION 4.5 The profit-maximising value o fs xSBD depends on p, a  and c. 
It is given by:
(4-21)x  SBD
c ( l - a )
i.e. the optimal value does not depend on the local government’s choice of sxCBD. In 
other words, s*xSBD represents the dominant strategy for the land-developer. It is its 
best response fucntion. However, it can be seen from (4.20) that a larger CBD would 
reduce the level of profit.
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It is straightforward to derive the effects of parameter changes on s*xSBD. It can 
be shown that s*xSBD a < 0, s*xSBD c < 0 and s*xSBD  ^ < 0. Tables 4.3a-4.3c represent 
numerical values for (4.21), where Tables 4.3b and 4.3c are given in Appendix 4D73.
G = 3
c C*iL-xSBD
0.00 1.00
0.50 1.00
0.75 1.00
1.00 0.75
10.0 0.07
Land-developer’s SBD for a  = 3 
Table 4.3a
Let us make the following comments regarding Tables 4.3a-4.3c: first, a higher 
value of a  leads, ceteris paribus, to a smaller business district, confirming previous 
results obtained in Table 4.1 and Tables 4.2a-4.2c. Second, the higher the 
transportation cost per unit of distance, the smaller should be the out-of-town 
development. This has to do with the fact that the equilibrium rental price in SBD 
depends crucially on c and the distance D between the two TNs. The land-developer 
should reduce D to counter-balance the increase in c in order to increase the 
attractiveness of its SBD. Third, the local government and the land-developer choose 
the same size for the SBD (see Tables 4.2a-4.2c). Even though this result depends 
crucially on the setup of this model, the economic intuition is as follows: the former 
is interested in maximising the citizens’ utility, the latter wants to maximise its profit. 
Citizens face a trade-off when allocating land for residential and industrial use within 
the city limits. On the one hand, they would like to consume as much land as possible 
for residential use, on the other hand less land available for industrial use would,
Note that for c = 0 (4.21) is not defined, we have thus set c -»  0.
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ceteris paribus, drive up the marginal cost of production and reduce the number of 
varieties on offer - raising the price index for IRS-sector goods. This is the trade-off 
they face in the case with one production site. However, in the case of two production 
sites they can minimise the effect on the marginal cost of production by having as few 
IRS-sector workers as possible in the CBD. The best policy is therefore to reduce 
sxcbd t0 free land for residential use and to choose sxSBD in such a way as to minimise 
LxCBD74. It can shown that s*xSBD minimises L x C B d  as given by (4.14a). The land- 
developer wants to maximise his rental income - at the cost of lost rental income to 
the citizens. Rental income to citizens is given by rxCBD sxCBD = (1 - p) LxCBD /  p so that 
minimising LxCBD also minimises their rental income.
4.3. The local government - the SBD outside the city’s jurisdiction
In the previous section we analysed the land-developer’s profit-maximising 
choice of the SBD. What is the local government’s best policy? The answer to this 
depends on the government’s control over the SBD. In this section we assume that the 
SBD is outside the city’s jurisdiction and hence the government cannot levy a tax on 
the land-developer’s profit. This could be the case when the SBD is in another state 
or county. The optimal policy is represented by the best response to the profit- 
maximising behaviour of the land-developer. The government’s choice variable in this 
case is sxCBD, taking s*xSBD from (4.21) as given. Utility can be derived by substituting 
(4.3), (4.6’), (4.15), (4.16’), and (4.18’) into (4.1’):
- S1CBD)0 ' “' I’){S1CBD+S\SBD'Z‘ T  W
\^ T •ZiZi)
(s,CBD  W( ( fc + a ^ JxCBD + ( °  + b '>I * ,SB D ^ ) d -
74 Note that citizens face the same price for an individual good, regardless of production location. To do 
so, firms in the SBD have to produce with lower cost than firms in the SBD. The marginal cost of 
production is much more important in determining the price index than the distribution of firms across 
the business districts - see (4.15).
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where:
K = aa bb (a IJ )(‘a(1' M)(2' 0) / (1' 0) ( n / ( 1 - ^ ))a(1‘M) and 
d = (a ( 1 - p ) ( 2 - cr ) - ( a + b ) ( 1 - a  ) / ( 1 - a).
Effectively, choosing the optimal sxCBD is a straightforward maximisation 
problem as there is no strategic interaction between the two agents. Numerical 
examples are given in Tables 4.4a-4.4c, where once again 4.4b and 4.4c are to be 
found in Appendix 4D. These tables can be used to compare the optimal zoning of the 
CBD in the present case with the case in which the local government is in charge of 
developing both sites. Tables 4.4a-4.4c differ only in the value of a . In the first 
column, we show the five different values of transportation cost c, in columns two to 
seven we present the welfare-maximising size of the CBD, the resulting utility level, 
the corresponding profit level for the land-developer and the number of firms across 
the two districts respectively.
a  = 3 
c c *——xCBD u K HCBD SSBD n
0.00 0.00 0.65 0.13 0.00 0.48 0.48
0.50 0.21 0.57 0.08 0.18 0.32 0.51
0.75 0.27 0.56 0.05 0.27 0.22 0.50
1.00 0.29 0.55 0.03 0.32 0.14 0.47
10.0 0.30 0.55 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39
Optimal CBD with land-developer for a  = 3 
Table 4.4a
First, note that the utility level and the aggregate number of firms is lower in 
the present case than in the case of section 3. This can be explained by the outflow 
of income in the form of profit, giving rise to lower disposable income for the 
citizens. Second and crucially, the size of the CBD is larger than in the comparable 
cases of Tables 4.2a-4.2c.
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PROPOSITION 4 .6  The government should zone more land for industrial use in 
the case with the profit-maximising land-developer than without it.
This is the best policy response when the out-of-town development is outside 
the city’s jurisdiction. In Table 4.5 we provide the ratios which result from comparing 
the CBD’s welfare-maximising size in the case with the land-developer with the case 
without the land-developer. These ratios are derived from Tables 4.2a-4.2c and 4.4a- 
4.4c. See Appendix 4D for Table 4.5b.
c a  = 3
0.00 - undefined -
0.50 1.50
0.75 1.35
1.00 1.16
10.0 1.00
Ratio of CBD’s size for a  = 3 
Table 4.5a
This result is due to the fact that the rental price of land is determined within 
the CBD and depends on sxCBD. By zoning a larger CBD, the government can lower 
rxCBD and therefore also rxSBD. As profit is given by rSBD sxSBD and as the SBD’s size 
is independent of sxCBD, profit overall falls. This can be directly seen from (4.20). The 
government thus has an incentive to zone more land for industrial use within the CBD 
just to reduce the land-developer’s profit. So even though there is an opportunity cost 
of increasing sxCBD (less land for residential use), this is more than offset by the rise 
in income. Finally, as the land-developer’s profit is the higher the lower the per unit 
transportation cost c, it is not surprising that the ratio of ‘over-expansion’ is larger for 
lower values of c (see Table 4.5a).
As an example, consider the case of The City of London versus Docklands in 
London, England. The development of Docklands in general and of Canary Wharf in
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particular was based on the assumption of stable, high rental prices, determined within 
The City of London. The developers of the Canary Wharf complex (the Reichman 
brothers) detected a demand for high-quality office space in the late 1980s. They 
knew, however, that the rental prices in their development would have to be set below 
the ones demanded in The City to compensate for the lower level of accessibility. 
Given that the Corporation of London (the management body of The City) could not 
prevent the development of Canary Wharf per se as it was outside its jurisdiction, the 
strategy followed was to aggressively promote the expansion of office capacity within 
The City - a change of policy compared to the more cautious guidelines set out 
previously. This - and other factors not mentioned in this model - suppressed rental 
prices in The City and in Docklands. As a consequence, the Canary W harf 
development had high vacancy rates initially and its developers went into receivership 
in the early 1990s.
4.4. Extensions
The SBD within the city’s jurisdiction
Finally, let us consider the case in which the SBD is within the city’s 
jurisdiction. The government could then levy a tax directly on the developer’s profit. 
Net profit is given by:
where t is the tax rate set by the government with 0 < t < 1. Suppose that the 
government sets t = 1, i.e. the government taxes away the whole profit. From (4.21) 
we know that this does not affect s*xSBD. Tax revenues TR are then redistributed to the 
citizens. Total income Edt in the city is:
x S B D x S B D  ’
(4.20’)
Edt=wL+(  1 - a - b ) E dt +r :C B D  x C B D (4.23)
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where the subscript stands for development and taxation and TR equals total profit as 
given by (4.20). With rxSBD = rxCBD T6:
Once again we have Lx = a p Edt. We can derive from LxSBD = Lx - LxCBD that:
i.e. the government is faced with exactly the same problem as in section 3. Given that 
sxsbd> the income level and the distribution of labour are identical to the case in 
section 3, the optimal zoning policy is also identical. Setting t = 1 makes ‘over­
expansion’ of the CBD unnecessary as the outflow of income has been stopped that 
way. It is obvious that this policy leads to higher utility levels than the policy in 
section 4.3.
5. Concluding remarks
The focus of this chapter was on local economic policies, especially on land- 
use zoning. Starting with a closed urban area with one (central) business district, we 
studied the optimal allocation of land between residential and industrial/retailing use 
when the industry in question requires land as an input and is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale. We demonstrated that under these circumstances, local 
government intervention in the land market could indeed improve on the market 
allocation of land. We were thus able to provide another reason why land-use zoning 
is welfare-improving in addition to the reasons generally provided in the literature.
'( 1 + r x C B D ^ S ixCBD xSBD
L CltXSxCBD (4.14a)'xCBD (b+a\i )(sxCBD+sxSBDi  )
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Extending the framework to include a potential out-of-town greenfield site for 
industry, we analysed the local government’s optimal zoning policies. We showed that 
optimal zoning of the central business district and the greenfield site (and thus the 
distribution of firms/shops across the two sites) depends crucially on the level of 
accessibility of the latter site: for low levels of accessibility, the greenfield site is 
relatively unattractive and residents’ welfare is maximised by having more firms/shops 
in the CBD - even though this implies less space for residential use. As accessibility 
improves though, more firms/shops should be encouraged to locate in the greenfield 
site, freeing space for residential use within the city itself.
The final aspect of this chapter was the introduction of a large-scale land- 
developer. It was argued that the rise of internationally operating and absentee land- 
developers has had marked effects on the economic environment in which local 
government is formulating and pursuing its policies. We showed that land-developers 
play a major role in shaping the economic landscape of urban areas. In the context of 
our model, this is done in two ways: first, the developer decides on the optimal size 
of its development, taking profit-maximisation as its main objective. Second, its 
existence affects the local government’s zoning policies. Specifically, we found that 
local government should zone more land in the CBD when the greenfield site is 
outside the city’s jurisdiction in order to minimise the outflow of rental income. This 
over-expansion of the CBD is not necessary when the greenfield site is within the 
city’s jurisdiction. In that case the local government can levy a tax on the developer’s 
profit and thus recoup its rental income.
Admittedly, the chapter made several assumptions which should be relaxed in 
a more sophisticated setup. For example, we completely ignored commuting cost and 
only considered transportation cost between the two transportation nodes. Introducing 
them we would be able to determine the equilibrium size of the industrial sites and 
the city itself and additionally the land rent gradient in the industrial and residential 
areas.
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Appendix 4A
In this appendix we discuss an alternative setup of a city. Let us assume that 
the city can expand along a featureless line of infinite length, where ‘featureless’ 
means the absence of distinctive natural features or man-made improvements. The 
exception is a transport node, which represents the centre of the city. Given the 
limitless amount of land available, the rental price of land would be zero and the city 
would expand infinitely if commuting to the city centre - for shopping or working - 
was for free. Let us therefore assume that residents face a commuting cost to move 
between different locations of the city. Given that all residents are identical, the 
equilibrium in the land market requires that all residents have the same utility level. 
This implies that a resident living further away from the centre than another resident 
needs to be compensated for the higher commuting cost by a lower rental price of 
land. The equilibrium size of the city is given when the resident living furthest away 
can just enjoy, despite facing a rental price of zero or some reservation price 
determined exogenously, the same utility level as the other residents.
While the size of the city is a function of the commuting cost, the expansion 
of the central business district (CBD) is determined by the competition for land 
between residents and firms. Suppose that firms face a transport cost to ship their 
production to the city centre. This implies that a firm located further away from the 
centre needs to produce at a lower cost to remain competitive in the centre. Assuming 
that commuting costs are zero once the residents are inside the CBD, the only way a 
firm could produce at lower cost is when faced with a lower rental price of land. The 
further away the firm from the centre, the lower must be the rental price.
The situation described above is shown in Figure 4.4:
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rland rent in CBD
land rent in residential area
0 ss 2
A city with commuting cost - market outcome 
Figure 4.4
Due to the symmetry of the city, we can restrict the analysis to one side only. 
The equilibrium size of the city is s2, with s2 moving further out, the lower the 
commuting cost. Firms can pay a higher rental price for land than residents between 
0 and st; i.e. the size of the CBD is s^ Residents live between and s2. This is also 
the equilibrium distribution of land uses in the city: a firm would not consider moving 
further away from the centre than slt as it could not compete with residents for land 
without making a loss. Residents would not move closer to the centre than s,, as the 
higher utility due to less commuting is more than offset by the high rental prices.
Even though it should be possible to derive an analytical solution to this setup, 
it would be more complicated than the one presented in section 2. For example, the 
determination of Lx (see (4.5’) and (4.6)) would be complicated by the fact that rental 
income to residents is now given by the shaded area in Figure 4.4. We would also 
have to consider the implications of having different land rents within the CBD on the 
profit-maximising input combinations of firms: a firm further away from the centre 
would substitute land for labour to take advantage of the lower rental price of land. 
We would lose an essential and simplifying feature of the model presented in section 
2, i.e. the symmetry of firms in equilibrium.
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The main insight provided by the model presented in section 2 is that zoning 
can lead to a higher utility level than the market equilibrium as long as residents have 
a preference for variety. The optimal zoning policy (i.e. over-expansion of the CBD 
compared to the market outcome) can be shown diagrammatically for the case with 
commuting and transportation costs:
land rent in CBD
land rent in residential area
oo
0 s.2
A city with commuting cost - zoning outcome 
Figure 4.5
The equilibrium expansion of the CBD is s,. However, the government should 
zone su for industrial use to maximise residents’ utility, leaving s2 - sn for residential 
use. The difference between Sj and sn should be the larger, the stronger the preference 
for variety. How-ever, this could not be an equilibrium: a resident would be interested 
in moving closer to the centre than su (but not than s,) as this would raise his/her 
utility level. We therefore need zoning to sustain this split of land use. In order to find 
su , we would have to find the total rental income, which is again represented by the 
shaded area in Figure 4.5.
The model presented in section 2 avoids the above-mentioned complications, 
while still capturing the main features of the city and the government's role in raising 
utility levels. The setup of the model presented in this appendix, while being more 
realistic and closer in spirit to the urban economics literature in general, would make
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it more difficult to derive analytical solutions without providing more insight to the 
role of the government. This is the main reason for choosing the model outlined in 
section 2 of this chapter.
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Appendix 4B
Expression (4.7) can be derived by partially differentiating ft with respect to 
sx and equating it with zero. Suppressing some constant terms, we get:
- q g ( l - n )
-$L = - (1  - a  - b ) {  1 - s xy - bsx (1'o)
OS
- a a ( l  -ji)
a g ( i  ~ ^) (i -v yi~a-»sx (1_0) =o 
( l - a )
Simplifying and rearranging then yields expression (4.7) in the text. We can 
also easily show that the second-order condition is negative for sx*.
The optimal value sx* is affected by changes of a, a  and p in the following
way:
,  ( l - * - * ) g ( l - n ) ( l - q )  . n  (B4.2)
“  da  ((1 - a - b ) ( \  - o ) - o ( j ( l  - | j ) )2
sxa* = ^ l L  = - __________ (1 a b ) (  1 n)a___________ < 0  (B4.2 ’)
( 1 - a ) 2(( 1 - a  - b )  - a a (  1 - | i ) (  1 - a ) ' 1)2
s ± = = ( l - a - b ) ( l - G ) a c  (B4.2” )
X|‘ 3(J ( ( l - a - f c ) ( l - a ) - a C T ( l - n ) ) 2
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Appendix 4C
This section shows the analytical solution to Proposition 4.4a: with c = 0 we 
have T = 1, hence expressions (4.3), (4.4’) and (4.15) can be simplified to:
1 “  P  xCBD
I-1 L.
y^xCBD^xCBD ^xSBD^xSBD) • v ;
xSBD
With T = 1 (4.14a) and (4.14b) simplify to LxCBD = a p sxCBD /((b + a p) (sxCBD 
+ sxSBD)) and LxSBD = a p sxSBD /((b + a p) (sxCBD + sxSBD)). Substituting these into 
(C4.1) and rearranging yields:
P = ( l - p ) (1_,l)p (1"0)
a
(b+a\i) )
o ( l - H )
(i-°) ro +~ \ (l-o) (C4.1’)
^ x  CBD xSBD'
Noting that E remains unchanged, we can now substitute (C4.1’) into (4.1’). 
We have:
U C(1 SXCBD) (1 °  ^ ( SxC B D +SxSBD )  ^ ^  »
(C4.2)
where C = aa bb (b + a p ) '(a + b) (1 - p)-a(1'^  (a (b + a >
0.
Using inequality-constrained optimisation (Lambert, 1985), the problem can be 
set up as follows:
-oo( i -n )
maxC(l sxCBDY l a b\ s xCBD+sxSBD) (1 o) (C4.3)
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subject to the four constraints sxCBD > 0, sxCBD < 1, sxSBD > 0 and sxSBD < 1, ie:
- a o ( l - n )
££ £ ( 1  a b\ SxC B D +SxSBD )  (1 0)  ( C 4 . 4 )
+  ^  1 SxCBD ~  ^ 2  ( SxCBD ~  *  )  +  ^ 3 SxSBD ~  ^ 4  ( SxSBD ~
Taking the first-order conditions of (C4.4), we get:
ZeO - K ( \  -9  Y a~b(c +V v 00 1^"*4^ 1"0)"1dSt? A V 1 xCBD ' ^ xCBD xSBD'_____________________
^ SxCBD (  1 "  0  )
( ( 1  ~ ° ) ( SxCBD +Sx SBd )  +  ~ SxCBD$) +  ^ 1  ~  ^ 2
(C4.5)
and:
d££ - a o ( \ - \ y . ) K ( \  ~sxCBD) 1 a b(sxcBD+sxSBp) °q(1 q)
^ SxSBD (  1 “  0  )
(C4.6)
+ A, -  XA - 0'3 4
We also need to satisfy the following conditions:
A,j > 0, d /  d Xj > 0  and Aj d ££ /  dl Xj > 0. Note immediately that X4 > 0, 
otherwise A^  < 0, violating one of the above conditions. Hence we have d S£ /  d X4 
= 0, i.e. the fourth condition is binding and therefore sxSBD = 1.
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Now look at (C4.5). Suppose that (1 - a - b) (1 - a ) (1 + sxCBD) + a a  (1 - p) 
( 1 _ s x c bd )  > Setting ^  = 0, we would satisfy the above conditions with ^  > 0 and 
the first condition is satisfied, i.e. sxCBD = 0.
However, now suppose that (1 - a - b) (1 - a ) (1 + sxCBD) + a a  (1 - p) (1 - 
s x c bd )  < Setting = 0, we would satisfy > 0 and the second condition would 
be satisfied, i.e. sxCBD = 1.
Both results describe an optimum, however the former gives us the maximum 
whereas the latter gives us the minimum. This shows that the solution (0, 1) indeed 
describes the maximum of the above problem.
For all cases in which T is neither 1 nor infinity (i.e. Proposition 4.4c), we 
cannot find analytical results. The first order conditions are nonetheless provided here. 
Substituting the relevant information into (4.1’), we find that:
where B = ((1 - p) / p)"a (1 ‘ (a p / (b + a p))'a (1' ° (1' M)' (1 ‘ a) and 0 =(1 - a  + e G 
p) /  G.
n ( l - q + n a )
( SxCBD+ S xSBD^  )  ( 1 ~ ( SxCBD +  SxSBD^  )U. B(  1 sxCBD)
0\~Tr^ oT (C4.7)
The first order conditions are then:
a ( 1  S x C B D )
x C B D (C4.8)
[ ( S x C B D + S x S B D ^  )  ® ^ ( S x C B D  + S x S B D ^  )  )B D
and also:
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\du, Q a ( e c s tSBD+ 2 ) e 1
dsx S B D
S x C B D  + S x S B D e
_  (C & S i S B D + 2 ) e
C 0
~T(  ^ +^ im )
= 0 .
E C (  1 + *VM/j )
c-0
^ x C B D  + S x S B D e
(C4.9)
Appendix 4D
a  = 2 
c c*-^jcCBD o*£ —xSBD u HCBD HsBD n
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.00 0.53 0.53
0.50 0.14 1.00 0.54 0.12 0.42 0.54
0.75 0.22 1.00 0.52 0.21 0.32 0.53
1.00 0.28 1.00 0.49 0.29 0.23 0.52
10.0 0.37 0.10 0.47 0.41 0.00 0.41
Optimal zoning for CBD and SBD for a  = 2 
Table 4.2b
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<5 = 4 
c xCBD ■2-jcSBD u HcBD HsBD n
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.00 0.53 0.53
0.50 0.14 1.00 0.63 0.16 0.37 0.53
0.75 0.20 0.89 0.61 0.26 0.23 0.49
1.00 0.24 0.66 0.59 0.32 0.14 0.46
10.0 0.28 0.00 0.58 0.38 0.00 0.38
Optimal zoning of CBD and SBD for a  = 4 
Table 4.2c
<5 = 2
c c* xSBD
0.00 1.00
0.50 1.00
0.75 1.00
1.00 1.00
10.0 0.10
Land-developer’s SBD for a  = 2 
Table 4.3b
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Q II
lo
o *
2_xSBD
0.00 1.00
0.50 1.00
0.75 0.89
1.00 0.66
10.0 0.00
Land-developer’s SBD for a  = 4 
Table 4.3c
a  = 2 
c C*£ —xCBD u n B c b d HSBD n
0.00 0.00 0.57 0.13 , 0.00 0:48 0.48
0.50 0.21 0.51 0.08 0.16 0.35 0.51
0.75 0.30 0.49 0.06 0.25 0.27 0.51
1.00 0.33 0.48 0.04 0.30 0.20 0.50
10.0 0.37 0.47 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41
Optimal CBD with land-developer for a  = 2 
Table 4.4b
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0  = 4
c o *_ _xCBD u n B c b d HsBD n
0.00 0.00 0.68 0.13 0.00 0.48 0.48
0.50 0.21 0.60 0.07 0.20 0.30 0.50
0.75 0.25 0.59 0.04 0.28 0.20 0.48
1.00 0.27 0.58 0.02 0.33 0.12 0.45
10.0 0.28 0.58 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.38
Optimal CBD with land-developer for a  = 4 
Table 4.4c
c c = 2  0 = 4
0.00 - undefined -
0.50 1.50 1.50
0.75 1.36 1.25
1.00 1.18 1.13
10.0 1.00 LOO
Ratio of CBD’s size for a = 2 and 0  = 4 
Table 4.5b
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Chapter 5
Concluding comments
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The purpose of this thesis was to study the effects of the ‘internationalisation 
of the world economy’ on regional economic policies. Specifically we focused on two 
general postwar trends which have had major implications on the economic structure 
of cities, regions and countries. First, the increase of the volume of trade relative to 
manufacturing production, especially in intra-industry goods, has unquestionably been 
the major manifestation of the ‘internationalisation of the world economy’ in the 
postwar era. This development provided the framework in which we analysed the first 
two effects on regional policies in the first two theoretical chapters of this thesis. 
Second, closer regional economic integration has allowed new retailing and business 
developments to more easily spread across regions and countries. One of these 
international developments has been the emergence of the business/retail park on out- 
of-town sites. The United States was the first country to witness this trend during the 
1950s-1960s, soon to be followed by other Western economies. Light manufacturing 
industry and the distribution sector have especially taken advantage of the new sites 
and have left the inner cities. The traditional central retailing district has also faced 
severe competition from these out-of-town developments and our modern urban 
structure would be unthinkable without out-of-town business/retail parks. In Chapter 
4 of this thesis, we studied some of the possible effects this trend might have had on 
urban economic policies.
Studying three different models, we showed under which circumstances and 
in which way regional economic policies might have been affected by these 
developments. It should be noted again that the models presented have been based on 
specific assumptions and are therefore not generally applicable - however, we think 
that the results still offer some valuable insights into the behaviour of regional 
governments and other large scale agents, especially when faced with a changing 
economic environment. In these concluding comments we present some of the results, 
policy suggestions and further thoughts on the potential real-world problems of 
implementing these.
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Turning to the first theoretical chapter - Chapter 2 - we focused on regional 
economic policies in a ‘new economic geography’ setting. Building on the models 
developed by Krugman, Venables and others, we studied the effects of regional 
economic policies on the location decisions of firms. We analysed under which 
conditions a less-industrialised region could attract firms from a more highly- 
industrialised region by using its regional economic policies. We showed that the 
‘internationalisation of the economy’ due to closer economic integration made it 
generally more difficult for backward regions to attract firms from the richer regions. 
Given this observation, what could the government of such a backward region do to 
improve its chances of attracting firms? It was shown that the efficiency level of the 
public sector was a crucial factor determining the attractiveness of a region. It could 
therefore be argued that emphasis should be put on raising the efficiency level of the 
public sector. Furthermore, the regional government should be aware of the opposing 
forces it creates and should be more ‘careful’ when setting policies. Indeed, it could 
be argued that the internationalisation has put pressure on regional/national 
governments to improve their public sector efficiency. This is due to the fact that 
closer economic integration has increased the level of competition between regions for 
footloose firms and has provided an outside option to_firms which didn’t exist to the 
same extent in the past, i.e. to supply a region with exports rather than to create 
manufacturing capacity in the region itself.
One main result of the chapter was that even i f  a less-industrialised region’s 
government improved its sector’s efficiency to a reasonable extent, it might still fail 
to attract firms under certain circumstances. It was shown that this was the more likely 
to happen, the stronger the agglomeration forces as generally discussed in the ‘new 
economic geography literature’. Given this rather sobering result, it was suggested that 
transfer payments from a richer region to the less-developed region could be necessary 
in these cases to improve the latter region’s attractiveness sufficiently to attract firms 
and to eventually lead to economic convergence. This is indeed what the European 
Union is doing with the Cohesion and Structural Funds which are used to improve the
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infrastructure in the less-developed regions of the EU. However, it was also noted (see 
also Fujita and Mori, 1996) that other EU policies such as improving the quality of 
infrastructure between more developed and less developed regions should not 
complement the transfer payments as improved access from the rich to the poor region 
reduces the attractions to firms to relocate from the rich to the poor region. This result 
thus has strong policy implications - which ought to be considered by policy makers.
Moving on to the next chapter, Chapter 3 focused on the tax raising/public 
good provision policies of regional governments. In that context we were able to 
derive explicit policy suggestions. The model in Chapter 3 analysed the effects of an 
increase in the volume of trade of intra-industry goods on the optimal tax policies of 
regional governments when these goods require a factor-augmenting public good for 
production. We showed that the higher the volume of trade between two identical 
regions, the lower would be the equilibrium tax rate - leading to suboptimal provision 
of the local public goods.
We were able to make a specific policy suggestion: the delegation of tax 
setting/raising power to a supra-regional body which would take into account the 
whole economy’s welfare level. Admittedly, this policy would lead to a total loss of 
sovereignty in the field of tax setting/raising by the regional governments and would 
therefore be rejected on these grounds alone by many regions. A second policy 
suggestion would be to encourage all participating regions to voluntarily coordinate 
their policies on the optimal policies. But who is going to be the coordinator? And 
who would be interested in following this coordinator’s advice? In such a ‘loose 
arrangement’, an individual government would have an incentive to deviate from the 
agreed policy. Such a setup would thus not be sustainable without some kind of 
punishment for deviating from the agreed policy.
Whatever the problems of implementation, it remains clear that policy 
coordination is required to exploit all the potential benefits from closer economic
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integration. As was shown in Figure 3.2 on page 89, a reduction in trade costs and 
hence a higher volume of trade could even lead to a reduction in welfare as long as 
the regional policies are not coordinated. Closer economic integration should therefore 
go hand in hand with closer economic policy coordination - in our case the 
coordination of tax rates.
In the third theoretical chapter, the effects of the internationalisation of the 
economy on urban policies are less direct than in the previous two chapters. It was 
suggested that the consequences of this trend on urban policies could work indirectly 
through the creation of a new type of large-scale agent: the absentee, large-scale 
business/retail park developer where the important assumption was that of the absentee 
developer. Many of these developers operate nationally or even internationally 
nowadays and it is the effects of their presence on regional economic policies which 
we studied in Chapter 4.
The main aspect of this chapter was to focus on the implications of out-of- 
town retail/business developments by these developers on urban zoning policies. We 
found that if the out-of-town development was developed by an absentee land- 
developer, then the local government should zone more land for retail/business use 
within its urban area than if the out-of-town development was also developed by the 
government itself. ‘Over-expansion’ of the urban business/retail development as a 
response to the absentee land-developer’s out-of-town development suppressed land 
rents in both developments and thus minimised the outflow of capital out of the urban 
area.
The above result depended on the assumption that the out-of-town development 
was outside the city’s jurisdiction - making it impossible for the government to tax 
any of the land-developer’s profit and leaving land zoning as the only policy 
instrument. Policy implications can be derived from this result: from the city’s 
government point of view, it should try to negotiate merger talks with the surrounding
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jurisdictions which make up the urban economy. By doing so it would be able to levy 
taxes on the developer’s profit - however this would be at the cost of the other 
jurisdictions’ governments. This is an issue in several countries. In Germany, for 
example, several cities form their own separate ‘Lander’, surrounded by other 
‘Lander’. In these cases retail/business parks have been developed along the city’s 
edge in the surrounding jurisdictions, taking advantage of the close proximity to the 
city’s market, while at the same time generally enjoying lower land rents and lower 
local tax rates. This phenomenon is especially important for the city itself as it has to 
provide an adequate infrastructure network for the economic activities going on in the 
city while parts of the potential tax base are located outside its jurisdiction. It is thus 
not surprising that many city governments seek to cooperate with their surrounding 
counterparts. For instance, Berlin was recently engaged in talks with its surrounding 
neighbour Brandenburg to create one joint ‘Land’. These talks, however, eventually 
failed in a referendum.
However, it is unrealistic to assume that the above suggestion of closer 
political and economic cooperation between jurisdictions can be implemented in many 
cases. Given this constraint, ‘over-expansion’ of the urban retail/business park is the 
best policy for the city government. This fact has consequences for the land-developer 
itself. Even though the development might be outside the city’s jurisdiction, it should 
take into account the above response by the city government: the land-developer 
cannot expect the city government to remain passive in the light of its development, 
instead it should expect an active response - even if this breaks with former city 
policy. The case of the Corporation of London, as discussed on page 126, illustrates 
that point well. Admittedly, the circumstances were different to the ones modelled in 
Chapter 4, for example the problem of competing land uses does not arise in that real- 
life example. However, it is true that The City represents the reference point for land 
rents in Docklands so that any policy change in The City would affect the Docklands 
development. Relative accessibility also played and still plays a major role in that 
case. And the Corporation of London’s decision to speed up the expansion of office
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space within the ‘Square Mile’ as a response to the Docklands development also fits 
the above model’s predictions (obviously other factors also played a role in that 
decision). It seems that the developers of the Canary Wharf site did not expect the 
Corporation of London to respond so aggressively to their development. This response 
led to a fall in the rental price of office space in The City and in Docklands and 
consequently to a fall in the latter’s developer’s profits.
The above three chapters only offer a small sample of models which could be 
written on the issue of ‘the internationalisation of the economy and its effects on 
regional economic policies’. Future research could start by addressing some of the 
assumptions made throughout this thesis. For example, based on Chapter 2, it would 
be worth studying the effects of corporate taxation on the agglomeration forces 
studied. Would we be able to replicate the results of Chapter 2? By studying such a 
setup we could provide useful arguments to the ongoing debate on ‘corporate taxation 
and industrial location’. Future research could also focus on Chapter 4. So far, Chapter 
4 tries to capture the ‘spirit’ of standard urban economics models without relying on 
all the standard assumptions normally made^e.g. commuting cost). This kept the setup 
simple and allowed us to focus on the issues of interest here. However, a more 
sophisticated model could try to incorporate the standard assumptions and thus could 
bring the model more in line with the literature. This would also open the model to 
further potential extensions, e.g. the endogenous determination of the city size (in a 
system of cities). A logical extension to this thesis would be to combine aspects of the 
different chapters. For example, it has been argued that urban regions are in stronger 
competition with each other than ever before. This is especially true for the service 
sector. Financial services, for example, are concentrated in New York, London and 
Tokyo. However, their dominance is constantly challenged by other urban areas such 
as Paris, Frankfurt, Singapore or Hongkong. In which way have urban policies been 
affected by this increased competition? We could study that by combining aspects of 
the ‘new economic geography’ literature with ideas of the urban economics literature.
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